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COPYRIGHT’S TWILIGHT ZONE1: DIGITAL COPYRIGHT
LESSONS FROM THE VAMPIRE BLOGOSPHERE
JACQUELINE D. LIPTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
“I did not want my readers to experience Midnight Sun before it was
completed, edited and published.  I think it is important for every-
body to understand that what happened was a huge violation of my
rights as an author . . . .  As the author of the Twilight Saga, I
control the copyright and it is up to the owner of the copyright to
decide when the books should be made public[ ] . . . .  Unfortunately,
with the Internet, it is easy for people to obtain and share items that
do not legally belong to them. . . .  This has been a very upsetting
experience for me, but I hope it will at least leave my fans with a
Copyright  2010 by Jacqueline D. Lipton.
1. The Twilight Zone Series (CBS television broadcast 1959–1964).
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Research, Co-
Director, Center for Law, Technology and the Arts, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law; Visiting Professor and Acting Director, International Center for Automated
Information Research, University of Florida Levin College of Law.  The author would like
to thank the following people for interesting discussions both in the blogosphere and in
real space about many of the ideas that went into this Article: Professor Deven Desai, Pro-
fessor Eric Goldman, Professor Steven Hetcher, Professor B. Jessie Hill, Professor Greg
Lastowka, Professor Michael Madison, Professor Cassandra Robertson, Mr. David Sanger,
Professor Mark Schultz, and Professor Rebecca Tushnet.  Additionally, the author would
like to thank Ms. Maggie Grace and the editorial staff of the Maryland Law Review for their
interest in the work and their dedicated editorial assistance.  The author would especially
like to thank Professor Ann Bartow for her willingness to write such a colorful and thought-
ful response to this Article, particularly given her views about the Twilight Saga.  (Any mis-
takes or omissions in the text are, of course, my own.)
1
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better understanding of copyright and the importance of artistic
control.”2
In this online posting, Stephenie Meyer, the author of the popu-
lar Twilight series, describes her reactions to the leak of a draft manu-
script of her work, Midnight Sun, and its dissemination over the
Internet.3  During production on the film adaptation of the book,
Twilight, Meyer was working on a new project, Midnight Sun, which
retold the original story from a different perspective.4  While Twilight
is narrated by the series’ heroine, Bella Swan, Midnight Sun retells the
story from the perspective of her vampire love interest, Edward Cul-
len.5  Meyer had released drafts of Midnight Sun to some individuals
involved in the production of the Twilight movie.6  The manuscript
was then leaked and appeared on the Internet.7  Meyer subsequently
posted her own “official” version of the Midnight Sun manuscript on
her website, urging her fans not to read any versions of the unautho-
rized, uncompleted text but encouraging them to read her version if
they felt so compelled.8
New Web 2.0 participatory technologies, such as blogs and online
social networks (“OSNs”), enable consumers to more readily interact
with digital works online.9  These technologies enable original cre-
ators of works, such as Meyer, to communicate with their fans about
their works.10  Meyer actively maintains digital contact with her fans
2. Stephenie Meyer, Midnight Sun: Edward’s Version of Twilight, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF
STEPHENIE MEYER (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/midnightsun.html.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. (explaining that “I have a good idea how the leak happened” as it “was given to
trusted individuals for a good purpose”).
7. Id.
8. Id. (“I’d rather my fans not read this version of Midnight Sun.  It was only an incom-
plete draft; the writing is messy and flawed and full of mistakes.  But how do I comment on
this violation without driving more people to look for the illegal posting?”).
9. See DAVID KESMODEL, THE DOMAIN GAME: HOW PEOPLE GET RICH FROM INTERNET
DOMAIN NAMES 126 (2008) (“Web 2.0 was a buzz word used to describe a new wave of Web
businesses that leveraged social networking, user-generated content, and other forms of
collaboration and information-sharing on the Internet.”); JANET LOWE, GOOGLE SPEAKS:
SECRETS OF THE WORLD’S GREATEST BILLIONAIRE ENTREPRENEURS, SERGEY BRIN AND LARRY
PAGE 294 (2009) (defining Web 2.0 as “[a] term used to describe an evolving generation of
a participatory Web” and “the proliferation of interconnectivity and social interaction on
the World Wide Web”); Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1459, 1460 (“From blogs to wikis to podcasting to ‘mashup’ videos and social network-
ing sites like Facebook and MySpace, the web 2.0 culture encourages users to engage,
create, and share content online.”).
10. KESMODEL, supra note 9, at 126 (explaining that Web 2.0 allows for collaboration R
and information-sharing).
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on her official website, updating them on her work11 and cross-linking
to their blogs.12  She routinely comments on how she would like her
work to be experienced.13 She has requested that her readers avoid
unauthorized versions of Midnight Sun.14  She has asked fans not to
post “spoilers” about forthcoming works.15  And she wants certain
materials removed from fan websites at particular times to avoid inter-
ference with the release of new movies and books.16  Meyer’s relation-
ship with her fans illustrates how Web 2.0 technologies enable today’s
authors and artists to actively engage in discourse with their fans17 and
allow fans to respond through text, mashup videos,18 and fan fiction.19
These forums advantageously contain rich anecdotal data from a
variety of perspectives for legislators and policymakers focused on
copyright law about emerging social norms and expectations.  Tradi-
tionally, commercial publishers, producers, and distributors took
center stage in debates about appropriate legal protections for copy-
righted works.20  Today, other perspectives are also available, includ-
11. See Seth, Comment by Seth, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF STEPHENIE MEYER (Aug. 2, 2010),
http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/index.html (“The paperback version of Breaking Dawn
will be released in a few hours and is currently available for pre-order.”).
12. Stephenie Meyer, Twilight Series Fansites, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF STEPHENIE MEYER,
http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/ts_fansites.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
13. See, e.g., Twilight Playlist, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF STEPHENIE MEYER, http://www.
stepheniemeyer.com/twilight_playlist.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2010) (suggesting a list of
music for her fans to listen to that Meyer “hear[s] in [her] head while reading [Twilight]”).
14. Meyer, supra note 2. R
15. See, e.g., Stephenie Meyer, Breaking Dawn, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF STEPHENIE MEYER
(July 7, 2008), http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/breakingdawn.html (requesting that her
fans refrain from posting or “spread[ing] . . . around” any Breaking Dawn spoilers on the
Internet because the book is “meant to be experienced in a certain way,” which an online
spoiler may ruin).
16. Id. (noting that many fansites will be removing message boards as a favor to Meyer
to reduce the possibility that a spoiler will ruin a fan’s reading experience).
17. Cf. supra note 9 and accompanying text. R
18. Lee, supra note 9, at 1509 (defining mashups as “works that incorporate . . . por- R
tions of copyrighted material from elsewhere into their works”).
19. Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural Theory of
“Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CAL. L. REV. 597, 598 n.6 (2007) (defining fan fiction
as “fiction about characters or settings written by fans of the original work, rather than the
original creators” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Aaron Schwabach, The Harry Potter
Lexicon and the World of Fandom: Fan Fiction, Outsider Works, and Copyright, 70 U. PITT. L. REV.
387, 387–99 (2009) (discussing the interaction of fan fiction, which “includes all derivative
fiction and related works created by fans, whether authorized or unauthorized by the au-
thor of or current right-holder in the original work,” with copyright law).
20. See, e.g., Summit Entm’t v. Beckett Media, No. 09-8161, 2010 WL 147958 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 12, 2010) (considering a request for an injunction by a movie studio claiming copy-
right and trademark infringement where an unauthorized Twilight fan magazine used
photos, promotional materials, and trademarks from the film).
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ing the views of original artists and their fans.21  In addition, the new
forums blur the line between consumers and creators.22  Consumers
have increasingly become creators.23  The ability of consumers, them-
selves, to create and to communicate with original authors profoundly
alters the matrix of norms and expectations surrounding uses of copy-
righted works online.24  While previous online intellectual property
battles focused on preventing digital copyright piracy in the face of
early digital technologies, Web 2.0 issues are more nuanced and com-
plex.25  Today’s consumer-creators have a very different set of interests
in copyrighted works because of the ease in making derivative works
and engaging in digital commentary and parody.26
21. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 12 (providing a forum for the author to communicate R
with fans and links to fans’ websites).
22. See Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation
Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 564 (2000) (explaining
that the Internet allows consumers to “play the roles of producer and consumer”); see also
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY 107
(2008) (explaining that “[t]he single most important effect of the ‘digital revolution’ is the
democratization of writing”).
23. See LESSIG, supra note 22, at 28–31, 106–08 (noting the capacity that remix technol- R
ogies give the new generation of children in terms of the potential to remix text, images,
film, and music); JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST
GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 131–32 (2008) (“[Y]oung people are not passive consum-
ers of media . . . but rather active participants in the making of meaning in their culture.
Their art form of the remix, where digital files are combined to create a new video or
audio file, is already having an effect on cultural understanding around the world.”);
Chander & Sunder, supra note 19, at 600 (“The increasing power and affordability of digi- R
tal tools may make it possible to go beyond rewriting stories in words, to permit video and
audio creations, often through mash-ups of existing copyrighted material.”); Margaret Ann
Wilkinson & Natasha Gerolami, The Author as Agent of Information Policy: The Relationship
Between Economic and Moral Rights in Copyright, 26 GOV’T INFO. Q. 321, 331 (2009) (“As
information technology continues to re-shape the future, the distributed, digital environ-
ment (where every author is also potentially a publisher and every user is possibly also
either an author or a publisher, or both) is challenging the oldest copyright controls, the
economic rights.” (footnote omitted)).
24. For example, numerous Twilight fansites use copyrighted materials from Meyer’s
books and the Twilight movies. See, e.g., Forums, TWILIGHT SERIES BOARDS, http://
thetwilightseriesboards.com/forum/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2010) (displaying photographs
from the movies and using characters, plot, and other copyrighted or trademarked materi-
als in various online postings).  Although this material might ordinarily infringe on
Meyer’s copyright, she encourages her fans to visit these sites by listing them and linking to
them on her homepage. See Meyer, supra note 12 (listing fansites on Meyer’s official R
homepage and linking to them).
25. Cf. PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 23, at 131–32 (suggesting that (1) “digital natives” R
break the law “on a regular basis” by illegally downloading music or watching television
shows or movies illegally, whereas “their parents and grandparents” had to purchase music
from a store, and (2) this shift “has forced us to rethink a system of copyright that is at odds
with the dominant social norms of a generation”).
26. See Chander & Sunder, supra note 19, at 600 (explaining how those expanding on R
original works can distribute their creations and have interests in their work).
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Web 2.0 forums, including OSNs,27 blogs,28 wikis,29 and virtual
worlds,30 have supported the development of online communities of
consumer-creators that are developing their own norms and expecta-
tions relating to the use of creative works online.31  Much of their Web
2.0 conduct does not fit neatly within existing intellectual property
paradigms.  Copyright law, for instance, aims to incentivize artistic in-
novation by prohibiting free riding on the works of others, usually in
the commercial arena.32  Newer online consumer-creator communi-
ties, however, generally engage in conduct that is not typically moti-
vated by commercial profit;33 the rewards of much of this conduct lie
instead in communicative and reputational value.34  An argument
27. Examples of OSNs include Facebook and MySpace. FACEBOOK, http://www.
facebook.com/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2010); MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/ (last visited
Sept. 9, 2010); see also LOWE, supra note 9, at 292 (defining social networking as “[w]ebsites R
that allow people to share ideas, information, and images and to form networks with
friends, family, or other like-minded individuals.”).
28. LOWE, supra note 9, at 288 (defining blog as “[s]hort for Web log, or a string of R
journal entries posted on a Web page”); PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 23, at 345 (defining R
blogs as “[o]nline journals written by individuals, ordinarily the unedited voice of a single
person,” explaining that “[t]he term derives from ‘web log[,]’” and noting that they “are
becoming an increasingly popular source of news” as “[m]ore and more people, young
and old, are writing and reading blogs”).
29. LOWE, supra note 9, at 294 (defining wikis as “[a] collection of Web pages that R
enables anyone who accesses them to contribute or modify content, using a simplified
computer language”).
30. PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 23, at 28–29 (describing the operation of virtual R
worlds, like Second Life, as online environments where participants can form their own
identities and interact pseudonymously).
31. See generally Steven A. Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix
Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1873–91 (2009) (examining positive aspects of allowing
social norms to function as a regulator of fan fiction and remix activities online).
32. MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 24–25 (4th ed. 2005) (explain-
ing that copyright law “provides the incentive to create information and a shelter to de-
velop and protect it” but is “limited in time and scope by such doctrines as idea/
expression, originality, and fair use” and “represents an economic tradeoff between en-
couraging the optimal creation of works of authorship . . . and providing for their optimal
access, use, and distribution”).
33. See Chander & Sunder, supra note 19, at 616 & n.114 (suggesting that “amateur fan R
fiction is typically authored without remuneration in mind,” but noting that commercial
success may be an effect (citing John Jurgensen, Rewriting the Rules of Fiction, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 16, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115836001321164886.html)).
34. For example, the pseudonymous author Cassandra Clare parlayed her popularity
in the fan fiction world into contracting for her own series of popular commercial novels.
See Robert Colvile, Boldly Go Where No One Has Gone Before, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK (Jan. 27, 2007,
12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/3350729/Boldly-go-where-no-one-
has-gone-before.html.  Cassandra Clare is a bestselling young adult author whose career
began in fan fiction. Id. Before publishing her own works, Clare wrote fan fiction involv-
ing Harry Potter and was praised for her originality and accused of plagiarism. Id.; see also
Chander & Sunder, supra note 19, at 613–16 (describing important communicative and R
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could be made that the noncommercial uses of copyrighted works in
this context should never conflict with copyright law.35
This Article argues that legislators and policymakers focused on
copyright law should take full advantage of the exponentially increas-
ing amount of information available in the blogosphere about emerg-
ing norms that govern the use of copyrighted works online.  Norms
can regulate a certain amount of conduct on their own, but laws
should also support these norms where possible and appropriate.36  At
the very least, laws should not flout well accepted norms if the norms
are not causing harm to one or more copyright stakeholders (no pun
intended).
This Article employs four case studies that involve the Twilight
books and movies to illustrate the types of norms that are emerging in
the Web 2.0 copyright context.  Part II outlines the challenges Web
2.0 technologies pose to existing copyright paradigms.  Part III in-
troduces the four case studies.  Part IV extrapolates lessons from the
case studies that might guide future developments in Web 2.0 copy-
right law and policy.  Part V sets out some conclusions about the fu-
ture of copyright law in the digital age.
II. COPYRIGHT AND WEB 2.0 FORUMS
Because of their interactive and largely noncommercial nature,
Web 2.0 technologies raise new challenges for the current legal sys-
tem, particularly intellectual property law.37  These laws have tended
to focus on the protection of economic rights,38 but Web 2.0 partici-
cultural contributions of fan fiction to existing literature and suggesting that amateur fan
fiction is not done for remuneratory purposes).
35. See infra Part III.C.2 for a discussion of the impact of commercial motivations on
the fair use analysis.  In other contexts, it has been noted that copyright holders do not
object to noncommercial uses being made of copyrighted works by fans. See, e.g., Mark F.
Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll:  What Jambands Can Teach Us About Persuading
People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 680–81 (2006) (suggesting that
“[j]ambands may surrender a great deal of control over their intellectual property to their
fans” but “do not allow their commercial releases to be copied” or “allow people to make
any commercial gain off their live recordings,” and noting that “some bands insist that fans
stop trading all recordings of a show if it is included in a commercially released live album”
or “require soundboard recordings to be withdrawn if a show is released commercially”).
36. See generally Hetcher, supra note 31, at 1934 (concluding that the “fair use doctrine R
creates an opening for norms to play a substantial regulatory role in copyright law”).
37. Chander & Sunder, supra note 19, at 616 (exploring the commercial motives be- R
hind amateur fan fiction in the context of parody).
38. LEAFFER, supra note 32, at 22 (“[T]he author is given, through the limited monop- R
oly of copyright law, a private property right over his creation, the worth of which will
ultimately be determined by the market.  The underlying policy of this constitutional provi-
sion is to promote the public welfare through private market incentives.”).
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pants are not typically motivated by financial reward.39  Fans share in-
formation about copyrighted works online, often posting short movie
clips or video mashups on blogs and other online forums.40  Their
behaviors and motivations differ greatly from the copyright “pirates”
who are targeted by existing digital copyright laws.41
The domestic nature of copyright law, even as augmented by in-
ternational agreements,42 creates practical enforcement limitations.
For one, the wide geographical dispersal of online fans makes it diffi-
cult to identify alleged online infringers.43  Even where the alleged
infringer can be identified, it may be difficult for a copyright holder
and the court to assert personal jurisdiction over her.44  But even if
jurisdiction can be established, bad publicity might haunt copyright
owners and licensees for bringing actions against their customers.45
The geographically dispersed nature of much online conduct has
prompted many commentators to suggest the need for multi-modal
approaches to regulating online conduct, particularly in the intellec-
tual property context.46  In the early days of the Internet, Professor
Lawrence Lessig famously promoted system architecture, or software
39. See also discussion infra Part III.C.2.
40. See supra note 24. R
41. Cf. Hetcher, supra note 31, at 1892–93 (noting that although some remix artists do R
not seek to commercialize their work, if they can, they will “to make a living”).
42. See, e.g., World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, adopted on Dec.
20, 1996, 112 Stat. 2860, 2186 U.N.T.S. 152; World Intellectual Property Organization Per-
formances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted on Dec. 20, 1996, 112 Stat. 2860, 36 I.L.M. 76;
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Part II, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat.
4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 102 Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3.
43. See, e.g., In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 246 (D.D.C. 2003)
(considering whether copyright holders can seek identities of alleged digital copyright in-
fringers from Internet service providers).
44. See generally Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for In-
ternet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1404 (2001) (concluding that the current
legal thinking on Internet jurisdiction tends toward a “targeting-based analysis” that re-
quires a determination regarding “whether the party knowingly targeted the particular ju-
risdiction and could reasonably foresee being haled into court there”).
45. On occasion, copyright holders take legal action directly against their customers.
See, e.g., BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889 (7th Cir. 2005) (establishing the proce-
dural history of the case, namely that a copyright holder brought an action against an
individual file sharer for copyright infringement).
46. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 5 (2006) (“In real space, we
recognize how laws regulate—through constitutions, statutes, and other legal codes.  In
cyberspace we must understand how a different ‘code’ regulates—how the software and
hardware (i.e., the ‘code’ of cyberspace) that make cyberspace what it is also regulate
cyberspace as it is.”).
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code, as a key regulator of online conduct.47  He also identified other
important regulatory modalities, including market forces and social
norms.48  Others have suggested other modes of regulation, including
public education and the use of nonprofit institutions to develop ef-
fective regulation of online behavior.49
Because this Article focuses on online communities organized
around particular artistic works, the two key modes of regulation con-
sidered here are legal rules and social norms.  Social norms are an
extremely important form of regulation within cohesive communi-
ties.50  Norms can be more powerful regulators than laws because, as
opposed to sanctions for infringing laws, sanctions for infringing
norms can be more immediate and more consistently enforced.51
As noted before, modern Web 2.0 technologies enable identifica-
tion of norms and expectations from the perspectives of authors, cre-
ators, consumers, producers, and distributors.  Looking at a broader
matrix of perspectives will allow regulators to enact and enforce laws
that better meet the needs of the larger community instead of focus-
ing on one or two interest groups with the greatest lobbying power.  It
is particularly important that future regulators consider the perspec-
tives of copyright audiences in the Web 2.0 context precisely because
of the blurred line between producers and consumers.52  Yesterday’s
47. See generally id. at 5–6 (explaining how code regulates cyberspace and noting that
“[w]e can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to protect values that we believe are funda-
mental” or “build, or architect, or code cyberspace to allow those values to disappear”).
48. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV.
501, 507 (1999).
49. See, e.g., Jacqueline D. Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”: Developing a Privacy Paradigm for
Digital Video, 95 IOWA L. REV. 919, 952 (2010).
50. See Lessig, supra note 48, at 513 (“In a small and closely knit community, norms R
might be the optimal mode of regulation; as that community becomes less closely knit, law
or the market might become second-best substitutes.”).  Although one may argue that a
group of online fans for a particular work is not the type of “cohesive community” usually
associated with norm development, in other copyright contexts, cohesive communities
have developed that are comprised of geographically dispersed fans of particular works.
Professor Mark Schultz has demonstrated this phenomenon with respect to jamband fans.
See generally Schultz, supra note 35, at 677–80 (exploring how a “fluid” and “large commu- R
nity” has developed “around [the] sharing of concert recordings and the bands who allow
it” through file sharing, email lists, and message boards).
51. See Lessig, supra note 48, at 507 (“Norms are enforced (if at all) by a community, R
not by a government.”).  The problem with norms in the online context, particularly with
respect to Web 2.0 forums, may be that many norms are in their infancy because of the
novelty of the technologies and of the communities developing around them.  As the com-
munities develop, norms may be more easily identifiable, more entrenched, and more con-
sistently enforced. Cf. id. at 508 (“Norms regulate behavior in cyberspace as well: talk
about democratic politics in the alt.knitting newsgroup, and you open yourself up to ‘flam-
ing’ (an angry, text-based response).”).
52. See supra note 22. R
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passive audiences are today’s downstream producers.53  This renewed
consideration of consumer-creators’ views of appropriate and inap-
propriate uses of prior works will help to shape a regulatory matrix
that protects both original producers and downstream producers of
derivative works.54
Regulators must also remember that laws have an expressive func-
tion as well as an enforcement role.55  Where possible, what the law
expresses should conform—in some measure—to society’s expecta-
tions about permissible and impermissible uses of copyrighted works.
Perfect alignment between each stakeholder’s views about copy-
righted works is impossible, but regulators must give some thought to
the balance between competing interests in these works.  One-sided
laws run the risk of being honored more in the breach than in the
53. Cf. LESSIG, supra note 22, at 106–08 (suggesting that children are encouraged to R
criticize and build upon their culture).
54. Currently, the exclusive right of making derivative works remains with the copy-
right holder. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103(b), 106(2) (2006) (setting forth the definition of
derivative work as “a work based upon one or more preexisting works,” limiting the scope
of copyright protection for such works “to the material contributed by the author of such
work,” and reserving all rights associated with derivative works for the copyright owner).
As two scholars have suggested:
United States law permits the copyright owner to claim not only his or her
own stories, but also the characters in those stories.  It grants the exclusive right
to make derivative works to the copyright holder.  The unauthorized author of a
derivative work such as fan fiction cannot claim a copyright in that work.  This
places the fan fiction writer at the mercy of the copyright owner, unless the fan
fiction constitutes fair use.  Thus, a fan fiction writer can pen stories employing
copyrighted characters only if: (1) the copyright owner explicitly permits such fan
fiction, (2) the copyright owner chooses not to pursue legal action against the fan
fiction writer, or (3) the fan fiction constitutes fair use of the copyrighted work.
Chander & Sunder, supra note 19, at 612 (footnotes omitted). R
55. Professor Neil Netanel writes:
[L]aw often serves an expressive or symbolic function above and beyond regulat-
ing or providing incentives for conduct.  Antidiscrimination law, for example,
may have symbolic importance beyond whatever discriminatory conduct it actu-
ally proscribes.  In enacting and applying such law, Congress and the courts effec-
tively express our society’s official condemnation of discrimination based on race
and various other classifications.  Similarly, the law might forbid certain market
transactions, such as selling body parts or children for adoption, not merely to
avoid harmful consequences that might ensue but to make a statement about
human dignity.  Laws that protect endangered species, forbid hate speech, and
require recycling also have important symbolic dimensions over and above their
regulation of conduct per se.  Such laws give vent to and help crystallize collective
understandings and norms.  In turn, by giving legal imprimatur to certain values,
they shape future perceptions and choices.
NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 104–05 (2008) (footnote omitted); see
also Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108
MICH. L. REV. 373, 407 (2009) (discussing the law’s powers beyond coercion, including its
expressive ability to clarify, legitimize, and shape socially acceptable behavior).
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observance.56  Copyright law has proved particularly problematic in
this context because of its emphasis on the protection of economic
rights (often to the detriment of other interests like free speech)57
and sometimes to the detriment of the author’s own rights in a work
she has created.58
III. COPYRIGHTING TWILIGHT: FOUR CASE STUDIES IN WEB 2.0
NORMS
A. Why Twilight?
The Twilight books and movies present some excellent case stud-
ies for examining the interaction between Web 2.0 norms and copy-
right laws.  The popularity of the books and movies has led to a
significant amount of online activity.59  The Twilight story appeals to a
variety of individuals,60 including the younger, very tech-savvy “digital
natives”61 and older “digital immigrants.”62  Stephenie Meyer’s active
participation in the blogosphere, maintaining a blog where she up-
dates her readers on developments with her work and links to fan
56. See LESSIG, supra note 22, at 44 (“Ridiculous, in turn, makes many of us willing to R
break the rules that restrict access.  Even the good become pirates in a world where the
rules seem absurd.”).
57. David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 673, 675, 714–15 (2000) (exploring the delicate balance between copyrights and First
Amendment guarantees).
58. For instance, where the author has assigned a copyright to a third party and later
objects to the way in which the copyright holder chooses to exploit the work.  This has
arisen in relation to the colorization of films originally made in black and white in which
the copyright owner who seeks to colorize the films is not the original author.  See LEAFFER,
supra note 32, at 376 n.423 (discussing the colorization debate between copyright owners, R
authors, and others and the “moral right for visual artists”).
59. Stephenie Meyer, for instance, officially recognizes a number of fan-maintained
websites.  Meyer, supra note 12. R
60. A fruitful avenue for future research may include a study of the impact of social
norms among varying groups in the online context.  Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social
Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 921–22 (2005) (exploring the impact of
private information dissemination on OSNs on varying societal and cultural groups).  For
instance, while gender differences may not matter for the purposes of an early attempt at
identifying interactions between Web 2.0 norms and copyright laws, it is possible that a
work that appeals more directly to men could raise a different series of norms.
61. PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 23, at 346 (defining a “digital native” as one “born R
into the digital age (after 1980) who has access to networked digital technologies and
strong computer skills and knowledge” and who “share[s] a common global culture that is
defined not strictly by age but by certain attributes and experiences related to how they
interact with information technologies, information itself, one another, and other people
and institutions”).
62. Id. (defining a “digital immigrant” as “[a] person who has adopted the Internet
and related technologies, but who was born prior to the advent of the digital age”).
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websites, encourages the online dialogue.63  She invites fans to partici-
pate in new releases of the Twilight films;64 she cites reader comments
on her blog;65 she shares outtakes from early draft novels with her
fans.66  She has also been actively involved in the development of the
film adaptations of her novels (even taking a small cameo role in the
first Twilight film).67  She is not the only copyright-creator to commu-
nicate online with fans and commercial adaptors of her work,68 but
the immense popularity of her work and the scope and scale of her
online communications generates a useful set of anecdotal data about
emerging Web 2.0 copyright norms.
The Twilight story has also generated a large volume of online fan
commentary.  Moving beyond just the Twilight books, fans have be-
come obsessed with the actors and directors and have created many
unauthorized fan websites devoted to lead actors Kristen Stewart,69
Robert Pattinson,70 and Taylor Lautner.71  Both the books and movies
have also spawned a significant volume of online fan fiction, allowing
fans to retell the stories from different characters’ perspectives or to
write stories in their own voices.72
63. See Seth, supra note 11. R
64. Stephenie Meyer, Comment to Readers on May 17, 2010, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF
STEPHENIE MEYER, http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/index.html (inviting members of fan-
sites to meet with her to celebrate the preview of the third film, Eclipse).
65. See Reviews for Twilight, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF STEPHENIE MEYER, http://www.
stepheniemeyer.com/twilight_reviews.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (posting fan re-
views on Twilight from Amazon.com and teen readers).
66. Outtakes, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF STEPHENIE MEYER, http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/
twilight_outtakes.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (posting portions of rough drafts not
included in the final drafts).
67. Full Cast and Crew for Twilight, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1099212/fullc-
redits#cast (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (portraying an uncredited diner customer).
68. For example, Cassandra Clare, author of the popular Mortal Instruments trilogy,
maintains a website to answer questions from fans and discuss possible movie adaptations
of her work.  Cassandra Clare, CASSANDRA CLARE, http://cassandraclare.com/cms/
home (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).  Other writers in similar genres who maintain their own
websites are Anne Rice, Charlaine Harris, Diana Rowland, and Kresley Cole. See Anne
Rice, ANNERICE.COM, http://www.annerice.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2010); Charlaine
Harris, CHARLAINE HARRIS, http://www.charlaineharris.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2010);
Diana Rowland, DIANA ROWLAND, http://dianarowland.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2010);
Kresley Cole, KRESLEY COLE, http://kresleycole.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
69. See, e.g., KRISTEN STEWART, http://www.kristenstewart.com (last visited Sept. 10,
2010).
70. See, e.g., ROBSESSED: ADDICTED AND DEVOTED TO ROBERT PATTINSON, http://
www.robsessedpattinson.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
71. See, e.g., TAYLOR LAUTNER ONLINE, http://taylorlautner.org (last visited Sept. 10,
2010).
72. See, e.g., Posting of Fan Fiction on Twilight Stories, FANFICTION.NET, http://www.
fanfiction.net/book/Twilight (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (giving Twilight fans a forum to
create fan fiction); see also Chander & Sunder, supra note 19, 598–600 (expanding on the R
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The parallel of the release of the Twilight books and their subse-
quent expansion to the big screen with the dominance of the In-
ternet, makes the Twilight franchise a very timely example of attitudes
toward copyrighted works online and a rich platform for this discus-
sion.  The books were published between 2005 and 2008.73  The first
movie was released in November of 2008,74 the second in November
of 2009,75 and the third in June of 2010.76  Thus, the information
about emerging online uses of copyrighted material is very current
and can be derived from current fan websites,77 Stephenie Meyer’s
official website,78 and websites administered by the movie production
company, Summit Entertainment.79
The following case studies present a variety of digital copyright
issues.  The first relates to the leaking of Stephenie Meyer’s Midnight
Sun manuscript.80  The second examines the phenomenon of fan
mashup videos81 posted on popular web hosting services, such as You-
Tube, and often reproduced on fan blogs.82  The third examines an
incident in an Illinois movie theater in which some Twilight fans
hosted a birthday party that included a screening of New Moon, the
second Twilight film.83  After the birthday girl’s sister video recorded
the party and captured a few minutes of the film,84 she was detained
for two days with the possibility of facing a larger jail term for her
actions.85  The final case study is an interesting example of turnabout
in digital copyright law.86  While many copyright disputes involve com-
mercial copyright holders (often music and movie producers) taking
action against smaller players (including fans) for unauthorized uses
of protected works, this study involves fans taking action against a
topic of fan fiction generally, claiming that “[f]an fiction spans all genres of popular cul-
ture, from anime to literature”).
73. STEPHENIE MEYER, BREAKING DAWN (2008); STEPHENIE MEYER, ECLIPSE (2007);
STEPHENIE MEYER, NEW MOON (2006); STEPHENIE MEYER, TWILIGHT (2005).
74. TWILIGHT (Summit Entertainment 2008).
75. NEW MOON (Summit Entertainment 2009).
76. THE TWILIGHT SAGA: ECLIPSE (Summit Entertainment 2010).
77. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 12 (posting links to fan sites). R
78. See, e.g., Seth, supra note 11 (posting updates regarding Twilight). R
79. See, e.g., Summit Entm’t, LLC, TWILIGHT SAGA, http://www.eclipsethemovie.com/
worldoftwilight/#/Home/HTBL/HBR (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
80. See infra Part III.B.
81. Lee, supra note 9, at 1509 (defining mashups as “works that incorporate . . . por- R
tions of copyrighted material from elsewhere into their works”).
82. See infra Part III.C.
83. See infra Part III.D.
84. See infra notes 264–65 and accompanying text. R
85. See infra notes 266–68 and accompanying text. R
86. See infra Part III.E.
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commercial movie producer.87  The complainants were fans who man-
age a website devoted to one of the leading Twilight actors, Robert
Pattinson.88  The administrators of the robsessedpattinson.com blog
were irritated when a commercial DVD production company copied
information from their blog to promote a commercially released DVD
documentary on Pattinson’s life and career.89  The complaints—
framed in terms of plagiarism rather than copyright infringement90—
while successful (the DVD makers removed the offending material
from their website), highlight the level of awareness and effectiveness
of copyright law in Web 2.0 communities.91
B. Case Study One: Midnight Sun
Midnight Sun was Stephenie Meyer’s attempt to retell the story of
her first Twilight novel from an alternate character’s point of view.92
While Twilight recounts the tale from Bella Swan’s viewpoint, Midnight
Sun was intended to tell the story from the perspective of her vampire
love interest, Edward Cullen.93  While editing some of her later books,
Meyer became interested in exploring how Edward reacted to first
meeting Bella94: While “Bella only kn[ew] that an incredibly gorgeous
boy [wa]s looking at her funny,” “Edward [wa]s suffering through one
of the most momentous days of his very long life!”95
After Meyer released confidential Midnight Sun drafts to actors
and others involved in the production of the first Twilight film to assist
with character and plot development, various unauthorized drafts of
the manuscript appeared online.96  Meyer was extremely upset, but—
despite knowing who leaked the manuscript—she posted a draft of
87. See Gozde, Thank You, ROBSESSED: ADDICTED TO ROBERT PATTINSON (Oct. 8, 2009,
7:44 PM), http://www.robsessedpattinson.com/2009/10/thank-you.html (posting about
the “site being a victim of plaigirism [sic]”).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (“Plagiarism is an awful crime and we should always stick together to fight it.”).
91. See infra Part III.E.
92. See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text.  In fact, Stephenie Meyer conducted a R
similar exercise in 2010 when she rewrote portions of the third book, Eclipse, from the
viewpoint of Bree Tanner, a newly turned vampire. STEPHENIE MEYER, THE SHORT SECOND
LIFE OF BREE TANNER:  AN ECLIPSE NOVELLA (2010); see also infra text accompanying notes
141–45. R
93. Meyer, supra note 2. R
94. Id. (explaining that Edward is dealing with “the shock and frustration of not being
able to hear Bella’s thoughts,” “the wild, monstrous reaction to her scent,” and “the incred-
ible expenditure of self-control that it takes to not kill her”).
95. Id.
96. See id. (explaining that the draft was “virally distributed without [her] knowledge or
permission”).
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the manuscript on her website instead of taking legal action or nam-
ing who might have been involved.97  She explained in an accompany-
ing note that she would prefer if her fans did not read the
uncompleted manuscript, but would prefer if they read her version
instead of an illegally posted version.98  She also stated that she felt
unable to complete Midnight Sun because the illegal leaking had effec-
tively derailed her artistic process.99
While she noted that the Internet distribution was “illegal[ ]” in
terms of infringing her copyright, Meyer also emphasized the inten-
tions of those who leaked the manuscript.100  Meyer’s emphasis on
intent is intriguing because copyright law involves strict liability.101
Thus, intent is not an element of a direct infringement action.102
Presently, intention is only relevant to certain forms of secondary lia-
bility, notably contributory liability for copyright infringement.103
Meyer’s thoughts, however, suggest that Congress should consider
revisiting the role of intent in digital copyright law.
Also illuminating was Meyer’s decision to publish her own version
of the incomplete Midnight Sun draft on her website.104  She
explained:
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (“So where does this leave Midnight Sun? My first feeling was that there was no
way to continue.  Writing isn’t like math; in math, two plus two always equals four no mat-
ter what your mood is like.  With writing, the way you feel changes everything.  If I tried to
write Midnight Sun now, in my current frame of mind, James would probably win and all
the Cullens would die, which wouldn’t dovetail too well with the original story.  In any case,
I feel too sad about what has happened to continue working on Midnight Sun, and so it is
on hold indefinitely.”).
100. Id.
101. 4 MELVILLE B. & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01, at 13-4 to -5
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (footnotes omitted)
(“Reduced to most fundamental terms, there are only two elements necessary to the plain-
tiff’s case in an infringement action: ownership of the copyright by the plaintiff and copy-
ing by the defendant.”).
102. LEAFFER, supra note 32, at 522 (“In general, infringement with innocent intent is R
not a defense to a finding of liability.  Outside of one narrowly drawn provision in the Act,
infringement of copyright is a strict liability rule, where intent of the copier is not relevant
in determining the fact of liability.”).
103. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971) (A party “who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a ‘con-
tributory’ infringer ” (footnote omitted)).  “Thus, if there is knowledge that the work in
question constitutes an infringement, then one who causes another to infringe will himself
be liable as an infringer . . . .”  3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 101, § 12.04[A][3][a], R
at 12-85 (citing Celestial Arts, Inc. v. Neyler Color-Lith Co., 339 F. Supp. 1018 (E.D. Wis.
1971); Vic Alexander & Assocs. v. Cheyenne Neon Sign Co., 417 P.2d 921 (Wyo. 1966)).
104. See Meyer, supra note 2 (providing a link to a “partial draft” of Midnight Sun).
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I’d rather my fans not read this version of Midnight Sun.
It was only an incomplete draft; the writing is messy and
flawed and full of mistakes.  But how do I comment on this
violation without driving more people to look for the illegal
posting?  It has taken me a while to decide how and if I could
respond.  But to end the confusion, I’ve decided to make the
draft available here . . . .  This way, my readers don’t have to
feel they have to make a sacrifice to stay honest.105
These comments highlight Meyer’s feelings about copyright and au-
thorial integrity.  She uses words that relate to her fans’ intentions with
respect to her copyrights.106  She speaks about the “violation” of her
rights and her fear about driving her fans to look for illegal post-
ings.107  Posting the draft herself is a solution that she feels will allow
her readers to enjoy her work while “stay[ing] honest.”108  In many
ways, the current copyright system leaves Meyer in an extremely diffi-
cult position: the more she talks about her rights under the system,
the more she alerts people to the availability of the illegally distributed
work.109  Thus, her rights do not seemingly help her in the Web 2.0
context unless she is willing to personally bargain with, or take legal
action against, every website posting illegal copies.  Even if she has the
time, the wherewithal, and the desire to do so, more websites are likely
to spring up every day, and many will be outside the jurisdictional
reach of domestic copyright laws.110
Alternatively, Meyer could attempt to pursue action against
search engines for secondary liability for copyright infringement.111
This is, however, a costly and time-consuming process, and the law is
105. Id.
106. Id. (describing fans who “obtain and share items that do not legally belong to
them” as “dishonest”).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. (questioning how to best “comment on this [copyright] violation without
driving more people to look for” the illegally distributed manuscript).
110. Cf. Joel C. Boehm, Note, Copyright Reform for the Digital Era: Protecting the Future of
Recorded Music Through Compulsory Licensing and Proper Judicial Analysis, 10 TEX. REV. ENT. &
SPORTS L. 169, 180 (2009) (noting the “problem of jurisdiction over international persons
and property operating on the internet”). See generally Lawrence A. Waks et al., Online
Copyright Infringement: Minimizing Exposure to Individuals and Small Businesses That Operate on
the Internet, 45 ADVOC. (TEX.) 40, 44 (2008) (“The issue of where the adjudication of a copy-
right infringement suit will take place is always a concern when dealing with a website
because personal jurisdiction in the context of online activities is generally determined by
the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of the exchange of information that
occurs on the website . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
111. Jonathan Band, Google and Fair Use, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 3 (2008) (noting that “by
virtue of linking to infringing material,” search engines may be held secondarily liable for
copyright infringement). But cf. id. at 3–4 (noting that because the most recent generation
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unsettled about the secondary liability of search engines for copyright
infringement.112  In the case of an unpublished work, like Midnight
Sun, there is no commercial publisher or distributor with deep pock-
ets to shoulder the burden of bringing legal actions against unautho-
rized online distributors of the work.  Instead, online copies of clips
from the Twilight films are occasionally found on services like You-
Tube but are quickly removed when legal departments at the “deep-
pocketed” movie studios claim copyright protection.113
Meyer’s comments also demonstrate her feelings toward her fans.
She understands their interest in her work and their desire to hear the
Twilight story from Edward Cullen’s viewpoint.114  She wants her fans
to enjoy her work and to “stay honest” in the process,115 but she would
prefer to maintain control over when and how her fans experience
her unpublished work.116  She hopes her fans will respect her wishes
and not read anything before she shares it, but she recognizes her
fans’ strong feelings about her work and acknowledges her indebted-
ness to them.117  Thus, she attempts to compromise by catering to her
fans’ desires without impinging too greatly on her artistic integrity.118
Copyright law does not really help her achieve any of this.  Instead,
of search engines “copy . . . actual webpages into their search indices,” often without the
website operators’ permission, they may be directly liable for the copyright infringement).
112. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 101, § 12.04[A][3][a], at 12-86.2 to -86.10 R
(highlighting current inconsistencies in imposing secondary liability for copyright infringe-
ment on Internet intermediaries, such as Internet search engines and online payments
systems, in the Ninth Circuit, which “has spoken to the issue of contributory copyright
infringement far more often and more recently than any other tribunal” (citing Perfect 10
v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir.); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487
F.3d 701 (9th Cir.), overruled by 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007)).
113. See Jacqueline Lipton, How to Make a Twilight Fan Remix Film Without Getting Sued,
THR, ESQ. (June 15, 2010, 8:51 AM), http://thresq.hollywoodreporter.com/2010/06/
how-to-make-a-twilight-fan-film-without-getting-sued.html (noting that YouTube and other
similar websites “will generally comply with” a notice from the copyright holder requesting
removal of “any infringing material” “because compliance will protect them from subse-
quent infringement liability”).
114. See Meyer, supra note 2 (“I hope this fragment gives you further insight into Ed- R
ward’s head and adds a new dimension to the Twilight story. That’s what inspired me to
write it in the first place.”).
115. Id.
116. See id. (“I’d rather my fans not read this version of Midnight Sun.  It was only an
incomplete draft; the writing is messy and flawed and full of mistakes.”).
117. See id. (“I do want to take a moment and thank the wonderful fans who have been
so supportive of me over the past three years. . . .  I only hope this note will stop all the
confusion and online speculation so that the Twilight universe can once again become the
happy escape it used to be.”).
118. See id. (“It has taken me a while to decide how and if I could respond.  But to end
the confusion, I’ve decided to make the draft available [online].”).
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she must set out her preferred terms of access and use for the work
and hope that her fans respect them.119
Her description of this wrong indicates more about her feelings
regarding authorial autonomy and integrity than her desire to exploit
economic rights in her developing work.  Her words imply a mismatch
between the objectives of copyright law and her own personal interests
in her work.  She blogs:
I did not want my readers to experience Midnight Sun
before it was completed, edited and published.  I think it is
important for everybody to understand that what happened
was a huge violation of my rights as an author, not to men-
tion me as a human being.  As the author of the Twilight
Saga, I control the copyright and it is up to the owner of the
copyright to decide when the books should be made public;
this is the same for musicians and filmmakers.  Just because
someone buys a book or movie or song, or gets a download
off the Internet, doesn’t mean that they own the right to
reproduce and distribute it.  Unfortunately, with the In-
ternet, it is easy for people to obtain and share items that do
not legally belong to them.  No matter how this is done, it is
still dishonest.  This has been a very upsetting experience for
me, but I hope it will at least leave my fans with a better un-
derstanding of copyright and the importance of artistic
control.120
Her comments are framed in terms of copyright law, but the overrid-
ing concern seems to be over issues foreign to modern copyright law:
the integrity of the authorial process and the honesty or dishonesty of
copyright audiences.121  Meyer’s description of the unauthorized dis-
semination of Midnight Sun as a violation of her rights as an author
and her rights as a human being122 are phrased in terms of personal
rights to the integrity of her work and of autonomy in controlling her
literary creation, not in terms of the right to control the economic
benefits derived from her work.123  Further, her concern with her
fans’ dishonesty is linked not to their intrusions on her economic
119. Cf. id. (explaining that she chose to make the Midnight Sun manuscript available on
her personal website because Twilight fans would otherwise be driven to look for the origi-
nal, illegal posting).
120. Id.
121. See LEAFFER, supra note 32, at 24 (“[C]opyright law provides the incentive to create R
information and a shelter to develop and protect it.”).
122. Meyer, supra note 2. R
123. See id. (referring only to the “very upsetting” nature of the experience and “the
importance of artistic control” and not mentioning the economic benefits associated with
the successful Twilight series).
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property rights but is instead linked to their intrusions on her per-
sonal autonomy.
The Midnight Sun case study suggests that copyright law fails to
address the needs of the creators of artistic works, as distinct from the
needs of the more commercially oriented producers and distributors
of these works.  Legal action against direct and secondary copyright
infringers would be time-consuming, cost ineffective, and distracting
for the unpublished author.124  Moreover, it would not effectively pro-
tect the interests with which the author is most directly concerned:
those related to her own integrity as an artist and those related to her
fans’ integrity as consumers of her work.125  Furthermore, copyright
law is doing nothing here to incentivize innovation.
Perhaps copyright law could have prevented Meyer’s suspension
of the Midnight Sun project126 if Meyer had instead used the appropri-
ate legal channels.  In other words, if Meyer had brought legal actions
against or sent cease and desist letters to a few key websites that had
posted Midnight Sun illegally, she could have sent an effective message
against copyright piracy, obtained injunctions, and perhaps gained pe-
cuniary damages.127  As a result, some individuals might have been
deterred from illegally posting the material, and others might have
removed the manuscript from their websites.128  Thus, one could ar-
gue that copyright law would have effectively protected Meyer’s rights
in this scenario if she had availed herself of its provisions.  The practi-
cal limitations, however, are the time, cost, and jurisdictional difficul-
ties associated with bringing actions against often anonymous,129
124. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair Use from
the DMCA’s Anti-Device Provisions, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111, 156 (2005) (noting that the
“existing copyright framework generally requires time-consuming and cost-ineffective liti-
gation” against direct infringers who are, in some cases, “difficult to locate”).
125. See generally Alina Ng, The Social Contract and Authorship: Allocating Entitlements in the
Copyright System, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 413, 481 (2009) (arguing
that the current copyright system “protects the interests of economic investors in the pro-
duction of creative works more than the interests of the author and the public”).
126. Meyer, supra note 2. R
127. See generally Michael Seringhaus, E-Book Transactions: Amazon “Kindles” the Copy Own-
ership Debate, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 147, 160 (2009) (“A copyright owner can seek damages
for, or an injunction against, unauthorized reproduction, public display, performance, or
preparation of derivative works via an infringement action.”).
128. Cf. Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement With-
out Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1351 (2004) (predicting that legal action
by the government against select online copyright infringers would have a “substantial de-
terrent effect on many [other] illegal users”).
129. But cf. id. at 1432 (noting that “what often passes for anonymity on the Internet
today will not” enable “uploaders to avoid prosecution” because copyright holders may
“compel the [Internet service provider] to disclose the identity of the ‘anonymous’
poster”).
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globally dispersed, and impecunious defendants in online forums.130
Copyright revisions, therefore, should be aimed at procedural difficul-
ties with enforcing copyrights rather than at the substantive provisions
of the law itself.
Nevertheless, Meyer’s focus on authorial integrity, as well as on
the intentions of her fans, indicates that there may be something
more going on.  Important values may be playing out in the Web 2.0
creator-consumer culture that copyright law is currently missing.  Leg-
islators and policymakers should think about whether the United
States should adopt something akin to a broader moral rights law that
better protects authors’ personal rights in their works, as distinct from
their copyrights.  Moral rights protect various aspects of an author’s
work, including the author’s right to be identified with the work
(called “attribution rights”)131 and the author’s right to have some say
in the way in which the work is presented to the public (called “integ-
rity rights”).132  Moral rights are more popular in European countries
than in the Anglo-American copyright tradition133 and are often op-
posed because authors who retain such rights can impede down-
stream copyright holders’ and licensees’ abilities to commercially
exploit the relevant works.134  However, moral rights could benefi-
cially complement current copyright law.
Of course, it must be conceded that in the Midnight Sun case
study, moral rights may not have practically helped Meyer.  Like copy-
right law, moral rights litigation suffers from practical limitations of
130. Id. at 1350 (noting that it is not “cost-effective for copyright owners to sue individ-
ual infringers, because there are tens of millions of them, because lawsuits are expensive,
and because many infringers would only be liable for (or able to pay) minimal damages”).
For a thorough discussion of the uncertainty related to Internet jurisdiction, see Geist,
supra note 44, at 1353–80. R
131. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 101, § 8D.03, at 8D-31 (“The first major moral R
right concerns attribution.  Conceptually, it falls into two poles—requiring use of the au-
thor’s name, and forbidding that usage.”).
132. Burton Ong, Why Moral Rights Matter: Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of Integrity Rights,
26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 297, 298 (2003) (“Integrity rights enable the artist to prohibit altera-
tions to his work by subsequent owners of the physical objects to the extent that such
alterations are injurious to his honor or reputation—such instances of manipulation of his
artistic vision are as offensive as direct assaults to his person.”); see also Part IV.B.
133. See LEAFFER, supra note 32, at 376 nn.421–22 (describing France’s “famous moral R
rights law” and noting that while “moral rights have found their greatest strength in West-
ern European countries,” thirty-five non-European countries also recognize moral rights).
134. Cf. id. at 387 (noting that moral rights may also interfere with contract rights over
copyrighted works in lucrative markets such as the motion picture, publishing, and broad-
cast industries); Ong, supra note 132, at 304 (“The restrictions placed on the owner’s abil- R
ity to make alterations to the work of art may have an adverse effect on the value of that
work as a private asset.”).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\70-1\MLR101.txt unknown Seq: 20 14-DEC-10 13:41
20 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 70:1
time, cost, and personal jurisdiction.135  Arguably, then, even if an au-
thor wants a specific right to the integrity of her creation, copyright
law basically gives her all that she requires in practical terms.136
Emerging social norms about respecting an author’s expressed prefer-
ence regarding online uses of her work may become a more impor-
tant protector against violations of authorial integrity than any form of
legal regulation.137  Optimally, legislators would create laws that rein-
force acceptable norms about permissible online uses of copyrighted
works.138  This way, norms could regulate on their own while the law’s
expressive and enforcement functions would help fill in the gaps and
bolster the effectiveness of norm regulation.139
In the Web 2.0 context, authors and their fans have increased
opportunities to engage in discussions about developing norms, which
assist in norm recognition and enforcement.  In the wake of the Mid-
night Sun debacle, for example, Stephenie Meyer was more careful—
and more articulate on her website—about keeping her second at-
tempt at additional character development under wraps until it was
published.140  In 2009, Meyer wrote a Twilight novella about Bree Tan-
ner, a secondary character in the third Twilight book, Eclipse.141  She
135. See supra note 130 (discussing the practical limitations of copyright law). R
136. See Ong, supra note 132, at 309 (“Scholars and practitioners have long debated R
whether the role of integrity rights can be fulfilled by pre-existing principles of . . . copy-
right law.”). But see id. at 310 (concluding that copyright law “cannot provide [a] perfect
theoretical equivalent[ ] to the sort of protection offered by” the integrity right).
137. See Casey Fiesler, Note, Everything I Need to Know I Learned from Fandom: How Existing
Social Norms Can Help Shape the Next Generation of User-Generated Content, 10 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 729, 734, 762 (2008) (arguing that copyright law “should use the existing social
norms associated with fan fiction as a framework for dealing with derivative works” in other
Internet forums and noting that the norms within the online fan community “derive from
the fans’ respect for the copyright holder”).
138. Cf. Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy
and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1360 (2003) (“The central task, then, is to reverse
Internet anarchy through a combination of education, technology and law, shaping each
in concert with the others so that the copyright balance can be restored and ownership
respected, while maintaining the important role of the public domain, fair use, and reverse
engineering.”).
139. See supra note 55 (noting that the law’s “expressive” function, in addition to its R
enforcement function, plays an important role in shaping society’s conduct).
140. See Carolyn Kellogg, Vampire Book to Aid Red Cross, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2010, at 2
(commenting that Meyer “closely guarded” the existence of a manuscript for a novella that
complements the Twilight series).
141. Bree Tanner is “a newborn vampire introduced in the ‘Twilight’ volume ‘Eclipse.’”
Quick Takes, Meyer Scores a Bestseller Again, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2010, at 3; see also Jennifer
DeCamp, The “Twilight” Zone: Love it or Hate It, Join in on “Eclipse” Premiere, FT. WAYNE J.
GAZETTE, June 29, 2010, at 8D (noting that Meyer “started working on Bree’s story while
she was editing ‘Eclipse’ and was imagining what life might be like for a newborn
vampire”).
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released early copies of the manuscript to those involved in the pro-
duction of the film adaptation of the Eclipse book, including the ac-
tress who played Bree Tanner.142  Meyer otherwise guarded the
manuscript carefully prior to its commercial publication.143  She rein-
forced the “confidentiality prior to publication” norm on her website
by posting a photograph of actress Jodelle Ferland (who plays Bree in
the Eclipse film) next to a bucket containing the ashes of her burned
copy of the manuscript when filming was completed.144  This posting
reinforced Meyer’s strong feelings about maintaining control over the
time and manner in which her fans experience her work (a message
she had previously delivered during the Midnight Sun situation).145
C. Case Study Two: Mashup Videos
1. The Remix Culture
While the Midnight Sun case study focuses largely on the author’s
views about her rights in her creative works, the second case study
focuses on the consumer-creators’ views.  With Twilight, as with many
other popular works,146 Web 2.0 participants utilize various aspects of
copyrighted works and remix them for their own expressive pur-
poses.147  These remixes may take the form of parody or criticism, but
they very often are simple expressions of ways in which fans relate to
the works.  Fans may want to experiment with attaching particular mu-
142. Stephenie Meyer, The Short Second Life of Bree Tanner: An Eclipse Novella, OFFICIAL
WEBSITE OF STEPHENIE MEYER (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/breetan-
ner.html (noting that copies were provided to screenwriter Melissa Rosenberg, director
David Slade, and three actors).
143. See Carol Memmott, Meyer Grants Twilight Saga’s Bree Tanner a “Second Life,” USA
TODAY (Apr. 2, 2010, 1:35 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/life/books/news/2010-03-30-
breetanner30_ST_N.htm (“In the novella, Meyer says, Bree has been a vampire for about
three months.  No other details [about the novella] are being released.”).
144. See Meyer, supra note 142 (“Keeping it confidential: Here is Jodelle next to the bucket of R
waterlogged ashes that were once the pages of her copy of the Bree manuscript.”).
145. See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. R
146. Chander & Sunder, supra note 19, at 598 (“Fan fiction spans all genres of popular R
culture, from anime to literature.”).
147. See Lee, supra note 9, at 1461 (“Informal copyright practices have developed, most R
notably, for [user-generated content].  Whether in blogs, fan fiction, videos, music, or
other mashups, many users freely use the copyrighted works of others without prior per-
mission and even beyond our conventional understandings of fair use.”); see also Pamela
Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 551, 552-53
(“Google and its popular subsidiary, YouTube, have . . . been sued for copyright infringe-
ment because users sometimes upload copies of other peoples’ copyrighted works, includ-
ing television programs and remixes of motion pictures to YouTube, which then makes
them available to millions of other users.”).
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sical tracks to images from movies.148  They may prefer to mix movie
images with their own artwork.149  They may want to experiment with
combining aspects of different movies or television shows to create
something new.150
The legal literature largely covers the extent to which these kinds
of remixes constitute copyright infringement and, if so, what kinds of
defenses may be available to the remixers in certain contexts;151 the
fair use and implied license defenses from copyright law take on par-
ticular significance in the remix context.152  This second case study
accentuates the gap between what the law actually says about infringe-
ment and fair use and what remixers think it says—or should say.
Remixers often attach labels to their work, stating that the work does
not infringe copyright, that the work is a fair use of the copyrighted
material,153 or that no copyright infringement was intended.154  These
assertions, however, do not make sense under American copyright
law.  Because of the vague,155 equitable rule of reason approach to fair
use in American law,156 a determination of fair use cannot definitively
148. See, e.g., lyssabbyx3, Love Story Apology—Edward and Bella—Twilight, YOUTUBE (June
28, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Wj7Nmox0T4 (attaching images of Edward
Cullen and Bella Swan from the Twilight films to a remix of Taylor Swift’s song Love Story
and One Republic’s song Apologize).
149. Cf., e.g., crischoch, Bella & Edward—Bleeding Love—Twilight, YOUTUBE (June 2,
2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=66LElNlD_Sw (combining various fan art
images with scenes from the Twilight “teaser trailer” and the “exclusive MTV scene”).
150. See, e.g., rebelliouspixels, Buffy vs. Edward: Twilight Remixed [original version], YOU-
TUBE (June 19, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RZwM3GvaTRM (containing a
mashup of scenes from Buffy the Vampire Slayer and Twilight, showing a “re-imagined narra-
tive” in which “Edward Cullen . . . meets Buffy the Vampire Slayer”).
151. See, e.g., Hetcher, supra note 31, at 1872 (noting that although copyright infringe- R
ment is “a central issue because much remix contains varying amounts of unauthorized
copyright-protected material,” a “strong argument” exists “that much of this remix is fair
use and hence legal”); Lee, supra note 9, at 1462 (arguing that “‘remix’ practice[ ] is [not] R
explained well by the conventional understanding of copyright [law]”).
152. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 9, at 1532 (noting that the implied license defense may be R
applicable to cases in which authors have “publicly supported the use of their characters in
fan fiction” or other works).
153. See, e.g., rebelliouspixels, supra note 150 (“This transformative remix work consti- R
tutes a fair-use of any copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US copy-
right law.”).
154. See, e.g., lyssabbyx3, supra note 148 (“THIS VIDEO IS PURELY FAN-MADE.  I OWN R
NOTHING, NO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT INTENDED.  EVERYTHING BELONGS
TO THEIR RIGHTFUL OWNERS.”).
155. See Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395, 401 (2009)
(“Fair use law, then, exists at one extreme as a body of vague statutory language and at the
other extreme as a collection of narrow, fact-specific, judicial decisions.”).
156. See LEAFFER, supra note 32, at 469 (“Although codified in the 1976 [Copyright] Act, R
the doctrine of fair use has retained its nature as an equitable rule of reason to be applied
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be made until a case is litigated.  No one can affirmatively state ex
ante that their use of a given work is a fair use.157
These consumer-creator statements might evidence an intent not
to infringe or an assumption that their creation is a fair use.  The
mere assumption or assertion, however, does not automatically make
the work a fair use.  Likewise, stated intentions not to infringe a copy-
right are irrelevant to a determination of copyright infringement.158
Consumer-creators who state that they did not intend to infringe a
copyright and make no particular assertion about fair use are perhaps
more realistic because they are saying nothing about whether their
use does, in fact, infringe a copyright.  But in the end, the statement is
not particularly meaningful as a matter of copyright law because in-
tention is irrelevant to a claim of direct infringement.159
Remixers might honestly think that their intentions are relevant
to a copyright claim.  They might additionally think (equally errone-
ous in many cases) that a remix constitutes a fair use under copyright
law.  They may suspect that they are infringing a copyright but believe
that stating their intentions not to do so might temper the response of
copyright holders; that is, hoping that a copyright holder who discov-
ers that a remixer lacked the intent to infringe might send a cease and
desist letter rather than file a lawsuit.
Public education may be the solution to the consumer-creators’
erroneous notions about what fair use is and how copyright liability
works.160  That begs the question, however, whether copyright law
where a finding of infringement would either be unfair or undermine the progress of
science and the useful arts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
157. As stated by one scholar:
Given the lack of clear rules for fair use and misappropriation, knowledge of cop-
yright law is often no better than ignorance of copyright law.  Even though I am
an expert of copyright law, my prediction of what is a fair use probably is no
better than the person on the street—or it could be even worse, given that a jury
will not typically be comprised of copyright experts and judges often are not well
versed in copyright law.
Lee, supra note 9, at 1468. But see Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. R
REV. 2537, 2541–43 (2009) (arguing that “fair use law is both more coherent and more
predictable than many commentators have perceived”).
158. Dane S. Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in Copyright, 54
RUTGERS L. REV. 351, 356 (2002) (noting that “American courts . . . have consistently held
that intent to infringe is irrelevant in determining liability for copyright infringement”).
159. LEAFFER, supra note 32, at 522 (“In general, infringement with innocent intent is R
not a defense to a finding of liability.  Outside of one narrowly drawn provision in the Act,
infringement of copyright is a strict liability rule, where intent of the copier is not relevant
in determining the fact of liability.”).
160. Garon, supra note 138, at 1340–41 (arguing that public education is necessary to R
“reconcile[ ]” “the Internet culture of shared information and the copyright culture of
authorial and artistic integrity”).
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should ever regulate fans’ remixes, particularly remixes that are non-
commercial in nature and likely do not interfere with the copyright
holder’s protected economic rights.  These remixes might, in fact, en-
hance the value of copyrighted works by increasing online discourse
and general interest in the works.161  The remixes and the associated
online discourse keep the copyrighted works in the public eye and in
the public mind, perhaps making it more likely that people will view a
film, rent or stream a video for a second time, or purchase an associ-
ated product like a soundtrack or wall calendar.162
Some copyright holders have already capitalized on opportunities
for fans to utilize their works online subject to certain conditions of
use.  For example, George Lucas’s company, Lucasfilm, has allowed
fan mashups and fan fiction relating to the Star Wars franchise—and
has even provided unique content to fans creating such works—as
long as his company takes ownership of the resulting works.163  This
may suit some fans who only intend to use the works for expressive
purposes and have no commercial motivations.  When he produced
Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog,164 Joss Whedon actively encouraged fans
to film their own videos related to the storyline165 and incorporated a
selection of those videos on the DVD release of the short movie.166
161. See Hetcher, supra note 31, at 1890 (“Indeed, [copyright] owners will sometimes R
stand to benefit from [the] enhanced exposure of their works [generated by remixing], for
example, through the fostering of a more devoted fan base.”).
162. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 113 (“[Twilight] remixes create more buzz for the mov- R
ies, which ultimately benefits the producers.  Summit [Entertainment, the studio that pro-
duced the Twilight films,] tolerates a lot of online fan activity—including fan-made trailers
for forthcoming films and even copying and posting extras from DVD releases.”).
163. HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA COLLIDE
156–57 (2006) (“In 2000, Lucasfilm offered Star Wars fans free Web space (www.starwars.
com) and unique content for their sites, but only under the condition that whatever they
created would become the studio’s intellectual property.”).
164. Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog (Timescience Bloodclub 2008); see Dr. Horrible’s Sing-
Along Blog: Editorial Reviews, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/Horribles-Sing-
Along-Blog-Patrick-Harris/dp/B001M5UDGS/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=dvd&qid=12650435
25&sr=8-1 (last visited Sept. 11, 2010) (describing Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog as “a 42-
minute musical romp” “[c]onceived as an ‘online miniseries event’ during the 2008 writ-
ers’ strike” that follows Dr. Horrible as he “video-blogs about his twin goals to join the Evil
League of Evil and to woo the fair Penny” who “he met at the local laundromat”).
165. See Liz Shannon Miller, Dr. Horrible DVD: Yes, It’s Worth Your Money, NEWTEEVEE
(Dec. 10, 2008, 7:44 AM), http://newteevee.com/2008/12/10/dr-horrible-dvd-yes-its-
worth-your-money/ (noting that numerous “fan-created applications to [join] the Evil
League of Evil” were submitted, “represent[ing] an international, creative, and surprisingly
talented community who were encouraged every step of the way to . . . participate in the
show’s success” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
166. See Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog: Editorial Reviews, supra note 164 (noting that the R
DVD includes “10 videos (a half-hour total) [that] were recorded by fans who want to join
the Evil League of Evil”).  A number of fan videos are also available at WONDERFLONIUM,
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2. Remixing and Fair Use
Regardless of what fans say they want, the law has its own limita-
tions with respect to video mashups and fan fiction.  In today’s cut and
paste culture,167 a prima facie case of copyright infringement is rela-
tively easy to establish in cases where clips of music, video, or text have
been taken directly from an original source and inserted into a new
consumer creation.168  Copying does not get much more direct than
this.  Applicable defenses, however, are seemingly not such an easy
question.  Judicial application of the defenses to the mashup video
context is unlikely to result in many clear cut answers.
The fair use defense, as currently set out in Section 107 of the
Copyright Act, provides in relevant part:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright.  In determining whether
the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the
factors to be considered shall include—(1) the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a com-
mercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and sub-
stantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the po-
tential market for or value of the copyrighted work.169
This defense is not intended to create a clear rule that delineates
when a particular use of a copyrighted work will be excused from lia-
bility.  Rather, it is intended to operate as an equitable rule of rea-
son—in the same way that the defense operated at common law prior
to its 1976 codification.170  Courts thus apply the various elements of
http://www.wonderflonium.com/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2010), which is described as “a
place where fan videos related to the Dr. Horrible sensation will be collected for your
viewing pleasure.”
167. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright
Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 245–46 (1996), for more on the “cut
and paste” culture.
168. Cf. Kevin C. Hormann, Comment, The Death of the DMCA?: How Viacom v. YouTube
May Define the Future of Digital Content, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1345, 1355 (2009) (noting that
“direct infringement is usually easy to spot; for example, if a user uploaded an unaltered
clip of a copyrighted TV show [to YouTube], it would” violate copyright law).
169. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
170. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 101, § 13.05, at 13-155 to -156 (noting that the R
Copyright Act of 1976 was the first “statutory recognition of [the] judge-made rule of rea-
son” and was not “intended to restate the present . . . judicial doctrine of fair use” (internal
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the defense with flexibility and discretion.171  Application of some ele-
ments of the defense to the fan video mashup context would likely be
relatively easy, but application of others is more difficult.  For in-
stance, it might be hard for a fan to argue that a mashup was created
for several of the purposes listed in the first paragraph of the defense:
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.172
It is possible that some mashups might count as criticism or com-
ment.  Some video mashups, for example, might include critiques of
the works on which they are based.173  Or a moviegoer’s homemade
online video review of a new movie, including clips from the movie
itself,174 may be a kind of mashup regarded as a criticism or comment
under the fair use defense.
In addition, a mashup that provides a particular artistic take on
the work on which it is based may be regarded as commenting on that
work.  One might compile a montage of female vampires from the
Twilight movies attacking other vampires, mix it with clips of Buffy,
from Buffy the Vampire Slayer also attacking vampires, and add accom-
panying music like “Sisters Are Doing It for Themselves.”175  Such a
montage might be regarded as a feminist comment, a critique of the
source material, or as a general commentary on feminism or “girl
power”—not as a specific comment on the underlying works sampled
in the mashup.
Assuming that a particular mashup falls within either the com-
ment or criticism area (or that a court finds the mashup to be other-
wise generally within the scope of a potential fair use defense), the
court must then apply the four factor fair use test in Section 107.176
With respect to the first factor—the “purpose and character of the
quotation marks omitted)).  The “scope and limits of fair use” should be determined,
therefore, by “reference . . . to pre- as well as post-1978 cases.” Id.
171. Joseph J. Raffetto, Defining Fair Use in the Digital Era, 15 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
77, 80–81 (2006).
172. 17 U.S.C. § 107.  Of course, these are not exclusive fair use categories.  Other uses
may be considered fair uses outside this list. See Raffetto, supra note 171, at 81 (noting that R
“the enumerated fair use factors” are “a non-exclusive list, granting courts the discretion to
consider other factors that might have a bearing upon the determination”).
173. See, e.g., ErickWithNoK, Twilight—Movie Review, YOUTUBE (Nov. 21, 2008), http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jk0UW_nvCb4 (providing a review and critique of the Twilight
movie).
174. See, e.g., CDTheBookMan, Movie Review: Twilight, YOUTUBE (Nov. 20, 2009), http:/
/www.youtube.com/watch?v=AaGuYS6VGs0 (mixing clips from the Twilight film with a re-
view of the movie).
175. ARETHA FRANKLIN & EURYTHMICS, Sisters Are Doin’ It for Themselves, on WHO’S ZOOMIN’
WHO? (RCA Records 1985) and BE YOURSELF TONIGHT (RCA Records 1985).
176. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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use”177—mashup videos shared over online services such as YouTube
and Facebook are generally not disseminated for commercial pur-
poses.178  The first factor, however, has been judicially characterized
as referring to the transformative use of a protected work.179  This ju-
dicial gloss on the statutory language developed based on the underly-
ing policy determination that copyright law should encourage
innovation and enhance the store of information and ideas within so-
ciety.180  Some judges have opined that purely consumptive uses of
copyrighted works should be given less deference under the fair use
defense than uses that transform the work in some way181 because
transformative activities contribute to artistic innovation in a way that
purely consumptive activities do not.182
If transformative use is an important aspect of the first factor,
then a court should scrutinize each mashup video on a case-by-case
177. Id.
178. Cf. Michael Allyn Pote, Comment, Mashed-Up In Between: The Delicate Balance of Art-
ists’ Interests Lost Amidst the War on Copyright, 88 N.C. L. REV. 639, 678 (2010) (noting that
“merely posting a mashup for download on a Web site,” such as YouTube, “may favor a
finding of fair use”). But cf. id. (“[T]he lines between nonprofit and commercial use seem
to blur to some extent regarding mashups.”).
179. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 101, § 13.05[A][1][b], at 13-162 to -173 R
(discussing the manner in which courts have applied the “transformative” and “productive”
use terminology to the first fair use factor).  Under the “productive use” doctrine, “ ‘mere
reproduction of a work in order to use it for its intrinsic purpose’ . . . may not be consid-
ered fair use.” Id. at 13-163 (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659
F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).  Based on con-
cerns that “the word ‘productive’ risks ‘the misconception that it encompasse[s] any copy-
ing for a socially useful purpose,’” some judges “prefer[ ] the term ‘transformative use.’”
Id. at 13-163 n.67 (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 11
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).  The Supreme Court currently adheres
to the transformative use “formulation.” Id.
180. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (characterizing the
first fair use factor inquiry as asking “whether and to what extent the new work is ‘trans-
formative,’” and noting that because “the goal of copyright . . . is generally furthered by
the creation of transformative works,” “the more transformative [a] new work, the less will
be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding
of fair use” (citation omitted)).
181. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 496 (1984) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (describing purely “consumptive uses” of a copyrighted work as not
being the kinds of uses the fair use doctrine protects; in particular, describing “[t]ime
shifting” of a television program by videotaping it to watch it later as a “consumptive use”
with no productive or transformative aspects to the use).
182. Cf. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 101, § 13.05[A][1][b], at 13-167 (noting R
that “the inquiry [has been framed] as . . . whether ‘the secondary use adds value to the
original—if copyrightable expression in the original work is used as raw material, trans-
formed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understand-
ings—this is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the
enrichment of society.” (alterations in original) (quoting Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol
Publ’g Group, Inc. 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998))).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\70-1\MLR101.txt unknown Seq: 28 14-DEC-10 13:41
28 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 70:1
basis to ascertain the extent to which the particular mashup is trans-
formative of the original work.  A video remix that aggregates ele-
ments from different copyrighted works to create a new work with a
new message may be highly transformative.  Rap music, for instance,
routinely aggregates snippets of earlier compositions to make some-
thing new.183  These kinds of transformative remixes have been com-
mon throughout the history of music184 and are becoming more
common in other fields online.185
Mashup maps present one recent transformative online trend.
Various services combine Google Maps186 with other information,
such as property listings or locations of crimes.187  Many of these uses
may technically infringe copyrights held by Google, but norms have
developed under which Google welcomes, rather than attacks, these
uses.188  Google obtains more good publicity and potentially more ad-
vertising revenue by allowing these kinds of uses.189  Google allows
other entities to freely embed their maps in Google online applica-
tions, which is likewise a good source of advertising.190
183. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572, 581–84 (holding that the commercial nature of a rap
music parody of Roy Orbison’s Pretty Woman did not preclude a finding of fair use because
the rap song was sufficiently transformative of the original work).
184. See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy
and Bess, and Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277, 301–10 (2006) (discussing the musicological
history of borrowing from previous works, particularly that of George Gershwin).
185. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 157, at 2554–55 (describing a fan mashup video, R
entitled “Brokeback to the Future,” which “uses music from the movie ‘Brokeback Moun-
tain’ and clips from [the] ‘Back to the Future’ movies to suggest that the two male lead
characters are in love,” as a transformative use that “recontextualize[s] parts of [two] ex-
isting works, thereby shedding new light on and contributing new insights about the
original[s]”).
186. Maps, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2010).
187. JEFF JARVIS, WHAT WOULD GOOGLE DO? 33–34 (2009) (describing innovative
mashup uses of Google Maps, including mashing Chicago crime data with Google Maps to
“enabl[e] residents to see every crime, by type, in any neighborhood”); Lisa Veasman,
Note, “Piggy Backing” on the Web 2.0 Internet: Copyright Liability and Web 2.0 Mashups, 30
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 311, 317 (2008) (noting that “a programmer constructed the
mashup HousingMaps,” which “allows Internet users to search for available housing by
viewing available housing listings and a map of those listings’ locations side-by-side,” “from
the Google Maps API and from ‘screenscraping’ craigslist.org’s housing listings” (citing
Data Scraping: Screen scraping, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screenscraping#
Screen_scraping (last visited Sept. 11, 2010); HOUSINGMAPS, http://www.housingmaps.
com/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2010)).
188. Presumably, Google also licenses at least some of this to online remixers as well.
189. Cf. Veasman, supra note 187, at 331 (noting that “if the infringing material has any R
‘draw’ at all, it draws customers and users to the . . . original website,” which is “a financial
benefit” for that website).
190. Id. at 316 (noting that Google currently licenses out maps for others to use on their
websites).
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An online video mashup review of a movie, book, or television
show that incorporates clips from the copyrighted work may similarly
be considered a transformative use and constitute a criticism or com-
ment under Section 107’s preamble to the fair use factors.191  While
many mashups are not used for nonprofit educational purposes as
contemplated in fair use factor one,192 they likely will nevertheless sat-
isfy the transformative use requirements often considered by courts
when applying the first fair use factor.193  The first fair use factor in
fan mashup cases will therefore cut in favor of the defendant con-
sumer-creator.194
The second fair use factor—the nature of the copyrighted
work195—will generally cut in favor of the copyright holder in cases
involving mashups of popular movies and other artistic works196 be-
cause the second factor contemplates that the more creative a work,
the more protection it should be afforded.197  The most common sub-
jects of fan mashups are movies, television shows, and music
191. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (stating that “the fair use . . . for purposes such as criticism,
[or] comment . . . is not an infringement of copyright”); see supra note 179 (describing R
transformative use under the first fair use factor).
192. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (explaining that one of the factors to be considered in the fair use
determination is “whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes”).
193. See Samuelson, supra note 157, at 2591 (“Transformative uses [of a work] include R
such things as remixing a song, making a mashup of clips from movies, or writing fan
fiction about one’s favorite characters.”).
194. There may naturally be cases in which a mashup is used for a commercial purpose,
which may change the analysis of the first fair use factor.  The above discussion has as-
sumed that most fan video mashups are available on noncommercial, publicly available
video sharing websites such as YouTube.  Where such remixes are made available on com-
mercial websites—that is, websites that charge fees for access or that subsidize their activi-
ties with online advertising—the result may well be different. See Pote, supra note 178, at R
678 (noting that while posting an audio “mashup for download on a Web site may favor a
finding of fair use,” because the mashup is noncommercial, “playing [audio] mashups as
part of a show at a club where the mashup remixer is paid to perform may favor a finding
against fair use”).  Thus, even though most applications of the first fair use factor to video
mashups will cut in favor of the consumer-creator, not all will.
195. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
196. Cf. Pote, supra note at 178, at 678-79 (concluding that “[b]ecause audio mashups R
contain samples of sound recordings that are creative works,” and “[c]reative works are
considered ‘closer to the core of intended copyright protection,’” the second fair use fac-
tor cuts against a finding of fair use in cases involving mashups) (quoting Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994))).
197. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 101, § 13.05 [A][2][a], at 13-186 (“Under [the R
second fair use] factor, the more creative a work, the more protection it should be ac-
corded from copying; correlatively, the more informational or functional the plaintiff”s
work, the broader should be the scope of the fair use defense.”).  As Nimmer suggests:
“ ‘This factor calls for recognition that some works are closer to the core of intended copy-
right protection than others, with the consequence that fair use is more difficult to estab-
lish when the former works are copied.’” Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586).
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videos198—the typical creative works that lie at the heart of copyright
protection as contemplated by the second fair use factor.199  They may
be contrasted with newspapers, nonfiction works, computer software,
and databases, which are less central to copyright’s predominant aim
of promoting artistic innovation.200
The third fair use factor—the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole201—may
cut either way depending on the specific mashup video in question.202
The amount and substantiality criterion may be applied quantitatively
or qualitatively.203  The fact that a consumer-creator only made a four
minute remix will not help her if she took something qualitatively sub-
stantial from the original work.204  If a remixer uses, for instance, a
key scene from a movie or an entire song, this may constitute a sub-
stantial taking under the third fair use factor.
The application of the fourth fair use factor—the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work205—may cut in favor of consumer-creators.  Remixes are unlikely
to negatively impact the copyright holder’s current or future mar-
198. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 9, at 1529 (“Another popular form of user-generated video R
is the movie trailer mashup, which involves taking snippets of a movie and transforming
them into a very short movie trailer, often in humorous ways unintended by the author of
the movie.”); id. at 1534 (discussing copyright issues arising out of a “user-generated
mashup” of the television program Grey’s Anatomy); Andrew S. Long, Comment, Mashed Up
Videos and Broken Down Copyright: Changing Copyright to Promote the First Amendment Values of
Transformative Video, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 317, 321 (2007) (describing the Boulevard of Broken
Songs mashup video, created from “various video and audio elements from Green Day’s
Boulevard of Broken Dreams, Oasis’s Today, Travis’s Writing to Reach You, and Eminem’s Sing
for the Moment”).
199. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 101, § 13.05 [A][2][a], at 13-186.1 (“‘If a R
work is more appropriately characterized as entertainment, it is less likely that a claim of
fair use will be accepted.’” (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659
F.2d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 464 U.S. 417 (1984))).
200. See id. (noting that “there is a ‘greater license’ [under the fair use doctrine] to use
portions of” works made by “‘diligence’ . . . such as a catalog, index or other compilation”
than works made by “‘originality or inventiveness’” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Roxbury
Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.N.J. 1977))).
201. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
202. Pote, supra note 178, at 680 (“[T]he determination of the amount and substantial- R
ity of the portions used depends greatly on the specific mashup and the specific samples
used in that mashup.”).
203. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 101, § 13.05[A][3], at 13-193 to -194; Pote, R
supra note 178, at 679. R
204. See Pote, supra note 178, at 680 (noting that “the likelihood of a finding of fair use R
is much greater” if the “samples [used in the mashup] are short and do not take [from]
the ‘heart’ of the original works”).
205. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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kets;206 they may instead create positive market effects.207  Further,
mashup videos probably do not serve as a “market substitute” for the
original movies or other media.208  Thus, it is unlikely that consumer-
creators will negatively impact a copyright holder’s market by substi-
tuting their products for those of the copyright holder.  One might
argue that the existence of free online movie mashups positively im-
pacts the copyright holder’s market because they generate more inter-
est in the original work.209
Copyright holders might argue that some mashups negatively af-
fect their markets.  For example, a particularly scathing video mashup
review of a movie may deter people from viewing the movie in thea-
ters or from renting, streaming, or buying the DVD.  Generally, how-
ever, the fourth fair use factor is not aimed at this kind of effect on the
market; the fair use defense is supposed to be copyright law’s attempt
to balance free speech against proprietary copyrights.210  Thus, one
would hope that a video mashup movie review would be treated like a
review in a newspaper or in any other news media211 that is typically
excused as a fair use to the extent that it copies material directly from
the work being reviewed.212
Ultimately, factors one and four in most video mashup cases are
likely to cut in favor of the consumer-creator213 while factor two will
generally cut in favor of the copyright holder.214  The third factor will
206. See Pote, supra note 178, at 681 (“Generally, for . . . mashups, fans of the original R
work will not purchase the mashup instead of the original work because the mashup likely
appeals to a different audience altogether.”).
207. Hetcher, supra note 31, at 1883 & n.59 (noting that fan-originated remixes gener- R
ally will not cause any economic harm to a copyright holder but may bring benefits and
using Star Trek example to explain this phenomenon).
208. Long, supra note 198, at 370 (“[M]ashups will seldom serve as a market substitute R
for the original product.”).
209. See JENKINS, supra note 163, at 200 (commenting that fans are viewed by many stu- R
dios as “‘inspirational consumers’ whose efforts help generate broader interests in their
properties”).
210. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (noting that the fair use de-
fense allows for broad scholarship, comment, and parody, which safeguards First Amend-
ment rights).
211. See generally Steve P. Calandrillo & Ewa M. Davison, The Dangers of the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act: Much Ado About Nothing?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 349, 365 (2008) (“[A]
journalist who quotes portions of a book or movie in writing a review for her newspaper is
held to have a fair use defense against copyright infringement.”).
212. Id.  See generally Christina Bohannan, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 1083, 1150-51 (2010) (“[F]air use favors the use of a copyrighted work for
purposes of comment or criticism, as in a book review or parody, even if the use puts the
work in a negative light.”).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 192–94, 205–12. R
214. See supra text accompanying notes 195–200. R
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depend on the context of a given case.215  Using a simple mathemati-
cal formula, most fair use cases would weigh in favor of the consumer-
creators: two factors will generally fall in their favor;216 one will fall
against them;217 and one will vary from case to case.218  Practically,
however, the defense is not applied in this formulaic way.  A court may
give particular weight to, say, factor two if the court is particularly in-
terested in preserving incentives to innovate in areas that go to the
heart of copyright protection.219
In summary, the fair use defense may prove problematic for
remixers.220  The fact that video mashups creators assert fair use and
state that their work is not an infringement does not automatically
make it so.  However, it is a time-consuming and costly proposition for
copyright holders to bring or to threaten judicial proceedings against
remixers.221  Moreover, the potential financial externalities of these
activities might encourage copyright holders to allow a certain
amount of online remixing.222  The examples of Star Wars,223 Doctor
Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog,224 and Google Maps225 mashups suggest that
copyright holders can work with online remixers without destroying
the economic viability of their copyrights.  Legislators and policymak-
ers should consider these thoughts when making decisions about the
contours of digital copyright law.  A copyright law that more readily
accommodates creative downstream uses of copyrights with greater
certainty of application than the current fair use doctrine would be a
welcome addition for many digital copyright users.
3. Remix Liability and Internet Intermediaries
Copyright holders who object to remixing and do not want to
bring actions against individual remixers may, of course, decide to
take action against services that host mashup videos, such as YouTube.
Depending on the way the web service is set up, there will be questions
215. See supra text accompanying notes 201–04. R
216. That is, factor one (purpose and character of the use) and factor four (effect of the
use on the market).
217. Namely, factor two (nature of the copyrighted work).
218. That is, factor three (amount and substantiality of the portion taken).
219. See Raffetto supra note 171 (noting that courts applying the fair use defense have a R
significant amount of discretion and flexibility).
220. See generally Lee, supra note 9, at 1509–10 (explaining why the issue of copyright R
infringement in remixing cases is far from “simplistic”).
221. See supra note 130. R
222. See supra note 207. R
223. See supra text accompanying note 163. R
224. See supra text accompanying notes 164–66. R
225. See supra text accompanying notes 186–90. R
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as to whether these services might be direct infringers or could only
be secondarily liable for the direct infringements of others.  For exam-
ple, a search engine only linking to content on other websites and not
reproducing the content itself would probably only be exposed to sec-
ondary liability claims.226  Current precedents on secondary liability
are not terribly clear227 and rely on the establishment of primary lia-
bility elsewhere.228  Thus, to succeed in a claim for contributory or
vicarious liability against a search engine, a copyright holder would
need to convince a court that the remixers whose work is indexed by
Google are infringing copyrights in the first place.
Direct infringement might be easier to establish in the case of
video hosting services like YouTube and Facebook.  These services do
host content posted by their users on their own servers.229  Their
terms of service generally attempt to contract out of copyright liability
by extracting warranties from users that nothing will be posted in
breach of copyright.230  Remixers who assert fair use might feel that
they have satisfied these terms; one reason many remixers put “no
copyright infringement” notices on their work may be to convince
themselves and the online service providers that they are not in
breach of the web host’s terms of use.
Most online services that host others’ content are quick to re-
spond to takedown notices received from copyright holders and will
leave it to the poster of the allegedly infringing content to subse-
quently establish fair use.231  The Copyright Act has been amended in
226. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160–62 (9th Cir. 2007) (find-
ing that Google is not directly liable for infringing copyrights where it does not itself hold
or reproduce copies of the protected images).
227. See supra note 112. R
228. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 940 (2005) (stat-
ing that secondary liability through the inducement theory cannot be established unless
primary liability was otherwise established).
229. See Jeremy de Beer & Christopher D. Clemmer, Global Trends in Online Copyright
Enforcement: A Non-Neutral Role for Network Intermediaries?, 49 JURIMETRICS 375, 382 (2009)
(noting that YouTube and Facebook, in addition to other online services, such as MySpace,
“host ‘user-created content’”).
230. As YouTube’s Terms of Service state:
You shall be solely responsible for your own Content and the consequences of
submitting and publishing your Content on the Service.  You affirm, represent,
and warrant that you own or have the necessary licenses, rights, consents, and
permissions to publish Content you submit; and you license to YouTube all pat-
ent, trademark, trade secret, copyright or other proprietary rights in and to such
Content for publication on the Service pursuant to these Terms of Service.
Terms of Service, Cl. 6.B., YOUTUBE (June 9, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/t/terms.
231. See, e.g., Copyright Claim Disputes: Filing a Counter-Notification, YOUTUBE (July 15,
2010), http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?answer=59826&query=
counter&topic=&type= (“When we receive a notification of alleged copyright infringe-
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the digital age to create a safe harbor for Internet intermediaries that
respond quickly to such notices.232  The law leans toward the protec-
tion of copyright holders and gives a significant amount of power to
copyright owners to decide the fate of mashups that involve their
work.  Even where there is some question as to whether a given
mashup is a fair use, the ability of the web hosting service to avail itself
of the safe harbor on receipt of a takedown notice will likely en-
courage the web host to err on the side of caution and remove the
posting; thus, web services like YouTube might remove much material
that is not infringing copyright.233  It may be difficult (and a high cost
burden) for the initial poster to establish fair use in the absence of
litigation determining that the use is, indeed, excusable under Section
107.
The current online availability of mashups might suggest that
many copyright holders are not too worried about the legal conse-
quences of their remixing.  This apparent lack of concern may also
reflect copyright holders’ hesitancy to aggravate their fan bases or
their appreciation of added interest in their works.234  Therefore, the
availability of remixes online heavily depends on the attitudes of copy-
right holders, which may vary greatly.  Universal Music Group, the
owner of some of the singer Prince’s copyrights, is very quick to assert
copyright ownership with respect to mashup videos posted online,235
but the owners of copyrights in the Twilight franchise do not seem so
concerned (at least judging by the number of Twilight related
mashups currently available on YouTube).236
This divergent approach may be an inevitable result: if we assume
that copyright holders should have the right to decide how their work
is used online, then it is unproblematic that some copyright holders
allow remixing while others do not.  However, if we assume that the
majority of remixing does not, in fact, infringe copyright—or at least
ment, we remove the posting that is the subject of the notification.  If we remove one of
your videos, we email you, and place a note in your account . . . .”).
232. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2879–86
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
233. Cf. LESSIG, supra note 22, at 2 (“Companies like YouTube are deluged with de- R
mands to remove material from their systems. . . . Copyright law gives [copyright hold-
ers] . . . power by giving [them] a quick and inexpensive way to get the YouTubes of the
world to help it protect its rights.”).
234. See supra note 207. R
235. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 22, at 1–5 (describing the aggressive stance taken by R
Universal Music Group on unauthorized use of snippets of Prince’s Let’s Go Crazy in a
YouTube video).
236. See supra note 162. R
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may be excused in many cases under the fair use defense237—there is
a potential problem.  Copyright holders are then arguably taking too
much control by effectively dictating how web hosting services like
YouTube handle mashup videos.  Driven to avoid copyright liability,
YouTube, Facebook, MySpace, and other OSNs will respond to take-
down notices received from copyright holders to the detriment of fans
engaging in non-infringing remixing activities.238
There may be a number of solutions to this potential problem.
Free market advocates would likely favor a solution that allows the
market to sort itself out without regulatory intervention.  Commenta-
tors are increasingly arguing that smart businesses in the Web 2.0 age
will open up to online interactions with their consumer bases, al-
lowing consumers to participate in online business activities.239  For
those who prefer regulatory solutions, it may be worth revisiting the
application of certain aspects of the Copyright Act to the mashup
video context.  The two most salient provisions of the Act implicated
in this context are the fair use defense and the safe harbor provisions
for online service providers.240  It is unclear whether—and to what
extent—particular mashup videos qualify as fair uses of copyright ma-
terial.241  If a clearer answer to the fair use question is provided, web
hosts will have greater guidance as to whether a copyright holder’s
takedown notice relating to a video mashup is reasonable.242
As noted above, the biggest disadvantage for consumer-creators
asserting a fair use defense in their mashup videos is that a determina-
tion of fair use cannot be made until the issue is litigated.  The ability
237. See supra text accompanying notes 213–18. R
238. See supra text accompanying notes 231–33. R
239. JARVIS, supra note 187, at 98 (“Collaboration with customers is the highest and most R
rewarding form of interactivity, for that is when the public tells you what they want in a
product before you’ve made it.  If you’re lucky, they’ll take ownership in the product you
create together.”).  While much of this literature has discussed businesses that focus more
on traditional goods and services, there is no reason why the same reasoning could not be
applied to the arts and entertainment businesses. See generally DON TAPSCOTT & ANTHONY
D. WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: HOW MASS COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 1–2 (2006)
(exploring how “[s]mart companies,” like MySpace, InnoCentive, flickr, Second Life, You-
Tube, the Human Genome Project, and “mature firms,” like Boeing, BMW, and Procter &
Gamble, “are encouraging, rather than fighting, the heaving growth of massive online
communities”).
240. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 512 (2006).
241. See supra note 219. R
242. But cf. Jerome Reichman et al., A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public
Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyright Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981, 993–94
(2007) (“[Internet service providers] and copyright owners have generally adapted to con-
ducting businesses within the framework of the notice and takedown regime of the [Digital
Millennium Copyright Act] safe harbors.”).
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of a remixer—and her web hosting service provider—to have a better
ex ante idea of fair use would be very helpful in practice.243  A
remixer’s mere assertion of a fair use defense is not enough.  Third
party guidelines would be very useful here.  Commentators have help-
fully suggested approaches to copyright law that take an ex ante ap-
proach to fair use.244  Alternatively, the issuance of guidelines by the
Copyright Office or some other expert agency on fair use in the
mashup context would be very useful.245  Remixers could then say
more than “no copyright infringement intended”246 and could, in
fact, assert a fair use defense and reference an authoritative (or at
least persuasive) guideline to support their claim.
4. Remixing and Licensing
Outside of the fair use defense, some remixers might try to refute
claims of copyright infringement by relying on an express or implied
license from the copyright holder to use the work.  While most video
mashups that include copyrighted material tend to either say “no
copyright infringement intended” or assert fair use,247 few refer ex-
plicitly to a license.  This may be so because an implied license de-
fense would be difficult to sustain in cases where a consumer-creator
has taken material from a work that includes clear copyright notices,
such as a movie or DVD that begins with a copyright notice and a
description of penalties for copyright infringement.248  But, in cases
where material that is remixed is taken from other sources—like pro-
243. Cf. Ashley M. Pavel, Note, Reforming the Reproduction Right: The Case for Personal Use
Copies, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1615, 1617 (2009) (“[J]udicial application of the fair use
factors to personal use technologies is difficult for innovators and users to predict ex
ante.”).
244. See, e.g., Jerome Reichman et al., supra note 242, at 1032–39 (arguing that a “re- R
verse notice and takedown regime would provide a needed balance in the U.S. anti-circum-
vention rules”).
245. See, e.g., AM. UNIV. CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, CODE OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE FOR
ONLINE VIDEO (2010), available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/fair-use/best-prac-
tices/online-video (“This document is a code of best practices that helps creators, online
providers, copyright holders, and others interested in the making of online video interpret
the copyright doctrine of fair use.”); Lipton, supra note 124, at 149–55 (suggesting that a R
“stand-alone [administrative agency] or a department established under the auspices of
the Copyright Office” could be used to “enable more people to have access to an inexpen-
sive and effective determination of their rights in relation to a particular copyrighted
work”).
246. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. R
247. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. R
248. Cf. Jerry S. Birenz, Caching World Wide Web Sites, 16 COMM. LAW. 13, 15 (1998) (not-
ing that “[a clear] copyright notice and warning [on a website] . . . may be sufficient to
protect against an implied authorization argument” by the infringer).
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motional websites for movies that incorporate publicity stills—an im-
plied license argument may be available.249
In Summit Entertainment, LLC v. Beckett Media, LLC,250 Summit, the
movie studio that holds the copyright in the Twilight movies,251 sued
Beckett Media for copyright infringement based on its
“reproduc[tion] without authorization [of] numerous images from
the [Twilight] films, as well as trademarks and promotional images as-
sociated with the films” in “two successive issues of a fan magazine
(the ‘Twilight Fanzines’).”252  Beckett Media was ultimately unsuccess-
ful in its assertion of an implied license defense against Summit.253
The defendant’s lack of success in this case, however, was attributable
to the fact that it exceeded the scope of the license with respect to the
images used.254  The defendant had displayed altered versions of the
images with the knowledge that the movie studio’s publicity website
clearly stated that users of the stills “will not edit, alter or modify any
of the Content without Summit’s prior written approval.”255  The de-
fendant fan magazine had also used photographs that were not availa-
ble on Summit’s publicity website.256
From this, remixers might learn where to find content that they
are allowed to use.  Movie studios and other copyright holders should
also think more about which content—and how much content—they
openly license to fans.257  Copyright holders may not want their audi-
ences to sample indiscriminately from their complete works, but they
may decide to make more material available for public use than cur-
249. Cf. Steven Hetcher, The Half-Fairness of Google’s Plan to Make the World’s Collection of
Books Searchable, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 67 (2006) (suggesting that “there
is indeed a good argument for an implied license [for website usage] given that websites
[unlike books] are open to the public).
250. No. CV 09-8161, 2010 WL 147958 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010).
251. See infra note 274. R
252. Summit, 2010 WL 147958, at *1.
253. Id. at *2–3.  The court held that Beckett Media had not carried its burden of estab-
lishing the existence of a license “since, most notably, [Beckett Media] ma[de] no effort to
account for its allegedly infringing photographs that were not even available on [Sum-
mit’s] publicity website.” Id. at *2.  The court also found it “likely” that Summit would
overcome any license defense “by establishing that [Beckett Media] impermissibly copied
[Summit’s] images beyond the scope of any license [Beckett Media] may have had to use
those images.” Id. at *3.
254. Id. See generally S.O.S., Inc., v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A
licensee infringes the owner’s copyright if its use exceeds the scope of its license.” (citing
Gilliam v. Am. Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 1976))).
255. Summit, 2010 WL 147958, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
256. Id. at *1.
257. Cf. Chander & Sunder, supra note 19, at 621–23 (noting difficulties in obtaining R
licenses for “critical reviews or lampoons” from copyright holders for fan fiction,
specifically).
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rently is the case.258  For example, clips from movie trailers might be
made available for public use.259  Many Twilight mashup videos do, in
fact, sample from copyrighted movie trailers.260  A number of
mashups are actually attempts at fan made trailers.261  Their home-
made trailers may be useful for studios for marketing purposes be-
cause they show copyright holders what fans think the trailer should
emphasize.
In the future, some copyright holders might create fan competi-
tions to develop movie trailers by releasing video footage and music
tracks from the forthcoming film.  Movie studios could potentially
save money on marketing by turning to their willing fan bases (that
would not demand compensation) in this way.262  A law clarifying that
such uses are permissible non-infringing uses of copyright works
under the rubric of fair use, of licensing, or of some other guise could
better support such activities more clearly than current law.263
D. Case Study Three: New Moon Video Clip and the Criminal Aspects
of Copyright Law
In November 2009, twenty-two-year-old Samantha Tumpach was
arrested in a Chicago movie theater for incidentally videotaping three
minutes of footage from the newly released film, The Twilight Saga:
New Moon.264  She recorded snippets of the movie while filming her
sister’s birthday party, which included a trip to see the movie.265  In
258. Cf. id. at 621 (“If there is a market for a work, then the copyright owner should seek
to maximize his or her profit by exploiting it—even if it means tolerating criticism.”).
259. But cf. Lipton, supra note 113 (noting that Meyer and Summit Entertainment “may R
object to certain fan remixes, particularly those that use extended clips or are misleading
in some way”).
260. See generally id. (detailing how “Twi-hards” are “borrowing copyrighted material
from the ‘Twilight’ movies and mixing it up themselves”).
261. Id. (“While some Twi-hards make it clear that their videos are not official trailers,
others are less transparent.”).
262. Cf. id. (“‘Twilight’ remixes create more buzz for the movies, which ultimately bene-
fits the producers.”).
263. See supra notes 243–46 and accompanying text.  Another possibility would be a stat- R
utorily implied compulsory license. See, e.g., Chander & Sunder, supra note 19, at 621–22 R
(noting that “rather than calling for fair use for criticism [of a copyright owner’s original
work], any reluctance to license criticism should simply imply a compulsory license, requir-
ing a royalty payment in lieu of a royalty-free use.”).
264. Shanne Schwarze, “New Moon” Taping May Put Woman in Prison, CNNENTERTAIN-
MENT (Dec. 4, 2009, 6:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/SHOWBIZ/Movies/12/04/
new.moon.arrest/; see Amanda Bell, Charges Against Accused “The Twilight Saga: New Moon”
“Pirate” Dropped, EXAMINER.COM (Dec. 11, 2009, 4:36 PM), http://www.examiner.com/twi-
light-in-national/charges-against-accused-the-twilight-saga-new-moon-pirate-dropped
(same).
265. Schwarze, supra note 264. R
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compliance with the anti-piracy guidelines issued to movie theaters by
the Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”), theater man-
agement notified the on-site police officer.266  Tumpach was then de-
tained and spent two days in jail before she was released and the
charges against her were dropped.267  Prior to her release, she poten-
tially faced a three year jail term and was “‘traumatized’” by the
incident.268
The director of New Moon, Chris Weitz, questioned whether the
arrest was justified,269 but there was little he could do about it.  He did
not hold a copyright in the film.  Expressing his views, he opined:
“There is, needless to say, a difference between trying to protect the
copyright of a film and making an unfair example of someone who
clearly seems not to have any intentions toward video piracy.”270  The
criminal law of copyright, bolstered by the zero tolerance policy
adopted by the MPAA,271 however, left little room for discretion in
enforcement.  Even if Tumpach intended to engage in video piracy,
the three minute video was not of sufficient length or quality to do so,
and the audio track was obscured by her talking throughout the
film.272
The actual copyright holder, Summit Entertainment,273 was in a
difficult position.  Summit Entertainment is a new movie studio that
has only recently ventured into the business of making and marketing
266. Muvico’s Official Response to the Rosemont Theater Piracy Incident, EARTHTIMES (Dec. 12,
2009), http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/press/muvicos-official-response-to-the-
rosemont-theater-piracy-incident,1087028.html#.
267. Bell, supra note 264. R
268. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
269. Amanda Bell, “New Moon” Director Chris Weitz Defends Perp in Piracy Case, Should She
Really Receive Jail Time?, EXAMINER.COM (Dec. 9, 2009, 4:32 AM), http://www.examiner.
com/twilight-in-national/new-moon-director-chris-weitz-defends-perp-piracy-case-should-
she-really-receive-jail-time.
270. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
271. MOTION PICTURE ASS’N, BEST PRACTICES TO PREVENT FILM THEFT 3 (July 2010),
http://www.fightfilmtheft.org/pdfs/BP_US_English.pdf (“The MPAA recommends that
theaters adopt a Zero Tolerance policy that prohibits the video or audio recording of any
portion of a movie and that prohibits the taking of still photographs.”).
272. See Seth Abramovitz, Swashvideoing New Moon She-Pirate Could Face Plank, MOVIE
LINE (Dec. 3, 2009, 3:00 PM), http://www.movieline.com/2009/12/swashvideoing-new-
moon-she-pirate-could-face-plank.php (explaining that Tumpach was “talking throughout
the taped footage in question”); Bell, supra note 269 (explaining that the movie was three R
minutes and that Tumpach was talking the whole time).
273. Public Catalog: New Moon, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://cocatalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
Pwebrecon.cgi?v1=1&ti=1,1&SAB1=Summit%20Entertainment&BOOL1=all%20of%20
these&FLD1=Name%3A%20Claimant%20%20%28KCLN%29%20%28KCLN%29&GRP1=
AND%20with%20next%20set&SAB2=New%20Moon&BOOL2=as%20a%20phrase&FLD2=
Keyword%20Anywhere%20%28GKEY%29%20%28GKEY%29&CNT=25&PID=O-BaOO786
KC7A1R2DyzXfdUPXm-O&SEQ=20100819195056&SID=3 (last visited Sept. 14, 2010).
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its own films.274  The studio owes much of its recent success to its Twi-
light fans275 (suggesting that it may not want to see them jailed on
charges of criminal copyright infringement), but Summit has to take a
stand against digital copyright piracy (or risks its own commercial fu-
ture).276  Summit’s official statement walked this fine line:
In regards to the situation with Samantha Tumpach, we
applaud Muvico [the movie theater] for upholding the zero
tolerance policy on piracy . . . .  The pirating of films is a very
serious issue and we all need to remain vigilant to protect the
art of film and the myriad of businesses that the film industry
supports.  We believe that the attention that this incident has
drawn, has served as a reminder to us all that any form of
film piracy, or perceived piracy, will be treated with the ut-
most seriousness.  Summit is pleased that all charges against
Ms. Tumpach have been dropped and appreciate the efforts
of the police and the prosecutors in this outcome.277
Summit was “pleased” that the charges were dropped but made no
apologies for the initial arrest or for failing to take public action to set
the matter straight.278  In fact, Summit reserved its praise for the ac-
tions of the police and prosecutors.279  Summit apparently took a
“hands off” approach, leaving resolution to the criminal justice
system.
While Tumpach’s video was never intended to be publicly distrib-
uted, the story surrounding her arrest and release were very quickly
disseminated over the blogosphere.280  Web 2.0 technologies that en-
able the public to comment on these situations might concern copy-
right holders, particularly those who want to maintain good customer
274. See Company Info About Summit Entertainment, SUMMIT ENT. (2010), http://www.sum-
mit-ent.com/ (noting that the “new studio was established in April 2007”).
275. See Kimberly Sherman, Postings Related to Summit, EXAMINER.COM, http://www.
examiner.com/summit-entertainment-in-national/kimberly-sherman (last visited Sept. 14,
2010) (“Due in large part to the overwhelming success of the Twilight Saga, Summit En-
tertainment has emerged as a prominent leader in the independent film world.”).
276. Cf. Lipton, supra note 113 (explaining that allowing “video remixes,” but R
“draw[ing] the line at [allowing fans to] post[ ] large chunks of the actual movies online,”
“may be an appropriate line to draw—allowing most fan activity but aggressively preventing
direct copying of the movies”).
277. Bell, supra note 264. R
278. See id. (noting that, in its official statement, Summit “appreciate[d]” the efforts of
police and prosecutors and “applaud[ed]” Muvico for its actions).
279. Id.
280. See, e.g., Patrick Corcoran, Charges Dismissed in Twilight Recording Case: Muvico and
Summit Release Statements, REEL BLOG: NAT’L ASS’N THEATER OWNERS (Dec. 11, 2009), http:/
/www.natoonline.org/blog/tag/samantha-tumpach; see also supra note 264 (noting online R
stories about Tumpach’s experience).
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relationships.  Presumably, Tumpach’s arrest will not prevent Twihards
(die-hard Twilight fans)281 from watching Twilight films and purchas-
ing the DVDs and soundtracks.  But, some may now think twice about
viewing other Summit films.
Summit executives may have engaged in a cost-benefit analysis,
realizing that they probably would not lose much, if any, of their audi-
ence by supporting the zero tolerance policy.282  It was more impor-
tant to support the MPAA’s stance against copyright piracy than to
protect one fan who recorded in a movie theater despite posted
warning signs.283  If one believes that theater patrons are clearly noti-
fied that recording movies is an offense and will be prosecuted, this
might be the right outcome.  But, perhaps a reasonable theater pa-
tron could interpret those warnings as prohibiting recording entire
films, as opposed to random (and commercially unusable) snippets.
Similar interpretative uncertainties arise here as with interpretation of
the fair use defense in the video mashup context.284  Just as there is no
clear ex ante guidance as to whether a particular mashup will be a fair
use or not, there is arguably also no clear guidance as to when a re-
cording in a movie theater is sufficiently de minimis not to attract
criminal copyright liability.285
Perhaps copyright distributors and movie theaters should be re-
quired to make their warnings against recording in theaters more pro-
nounced.286  Alternatively, police could be given more discretion
about when to detain a person for recording snippets (but this would
also require clearer or, at least, different guidelines than currently ex-
ist).  Perhaps in cases like the Tumpach scenario, police could be
given the clear discretion, supported by a MPAA statement, to confis-
281. One of the definitions provided by Urban Dictionary for “Twihard” is “a[ ] serious/
obsessive reader of the Twilight Saga by Stephenie Meyer.” Twihard, URBAN DICTIONARY,
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Twihard (last visited Sept. 14, 2010).
282. See supra text accompanying note 277. R
283. See Bell, supra note 264 (“In a continuing effort to educate its guests about the R
illegality of film piracy, Muvico prominently places a number of posters and signs within its
theaters alerting moviegoers of its ‘zero-tolerance’ policy with respect to the camcording of
films in its auditoriums.”).
284. See supra Part III.C.2.
285. Cf. Lipton, supra note 113 (“Congress and the courts might do well to take a look at R
what’s actually going on in the blogosphere in terms of the balances currently being struck
between copyright holders and fans.  Such a survey might help to formulate clearer copy-
right rules for today’s digital culture.”).
286. Cf. MOTION PICTURE ASS’N OF AM. et al., MPAA, NATO, CMPDA & MPTAC LAUNCH
FIGHTFILMTHEFT.ORG TO FIGHT ILLEGAL CAMCORDING IN THEATERS (March 13, 2006), http:/
/www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/07/moviereward.pdf (noting that
among the current camcorder piracy measures are “[w]arning signs” about “prohibiting
camcording”); see also supra note 283. R
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cate the physical recording—or perhaps even the recording device—
but to excuse the individual who made the recording.
E. Case Study Four: Robsessedpattinson.com Bloggers Versus Robsessed
DVD Producers
The consumer reviews section on Amazon.com for a documen-
tary entitled Robsessed, about actor Robert Pattinson who plays Edward
Cullen in Twilight, contains some revealing data.287  Amazon’s con-
sumer reviews incorporate feedback from customers about products
and services available on Amazon.288  Amazon encourages customers
to rate their past purchases from one to five—one being the lowest
and five being the highest recommendation for a product.289  A sum-
mary of customer rankings is presented in a bar graph on Amazon’s
webpage for the item, accompanied by a series of full text customer
reviews.290  Each product’s bar graph generally conforms to one of
two basic configurations: Customers either agree on the ranking (re-
sulting in a ranking that clusters around one or two consecutive num-
bers), or the rankings form a curve (representing a small number of
responses from people who like the product the least, a majority of
responses clumped in the middle, and a small number of high
rankings from people who love the product).
A popular product may receive rankings purely in the four to five
range while the rankings for an unpopular product may clump
around the one to two range.  Products with split consumer support
have a wider smattering of rankings—between one and five—but with
a majority of the rankings in the middle.  For example, the customer
rankings for Dan Brown’s most recent novel, The Lost Symbol, were
spread relatively evenly.291  As of January 21, 2010, The Lost Symbol re-
ceived 430 five-star rankings, 313 four-star rankings, 427 three-star
rankings, 498 two-star rankings, and 482 one-star rankings.292  Ama-
zon’s customer rankings for the boxed set of Twilight books, in con-
trast, were clustered around five, reflecting the popularity of the
287. Customer Reviews: Robsessed, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/Robsessed-
Robert-Pattinson/product-reviews/B002OKK2B6 (last visited Sept. 14, 2010).
288. See, e.g., id. (including a “most helpful favorable review” and “most helpful critical
review”).
289. See, e.g., id.
290. Id.
291. See Customer Reviews: The Lost Symbol, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/
Lost-Symbol-Dan-Brown/dp/0385504225/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1264118731
&sr=1-1 (last visited Jan. 21, 2010) (showing the evenly spread Amazon customer rankings
for The Lost Symbol) (graph on file with the Maryland Law Review).
292. Id.
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series.293  The boxed set received 1,757 five-star rankings, 129 four-star
rankings, 39 three-star rankings, 17 two-star rankings, and 69 one-star
rankings.294
These examples demonstrate how customer reviews tend to ei-
ther spread or cluster.  Interestingly enough, the reviews for the Rob-
sessed DVD did not follow either pattern.295  The reviews comprised a
large group of fives, nothing in the middle, and then a large group of
ones.296  The first few customer comments below the customer review
graph indicate why the graph looks like this.297  The reviews suggest
that the distributor of the DVD, Revolver Entertainment,298 copied
material from others, including fan sites, without permission or attri-
bution.299  Quite possibly, the people who ranked the video highly
knew nothing of the allegations (or did not care about them) while
those who did know about Revolver’s activities were extremely upset
and ranked the product accordingly.
Revolver apparently copied material from an unauthorized Rob-
ert Pattinson fansite, robsessedpattinson.com.300  The bloggers were
upset when Revolver stole material without authorization to advertise
the DVD on its own website and gave no attribution to the bloggers.301
The bloggers sent a cease and desist notice to Revolver.302  Revolver
293. See Customer Reviews: The Twilight Saga Collection, AMAZON.COM, http://www.ama-
zon.com/Twilight-Saga-Collection-Stephenie-Meyer/dp/0316031844/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8
&s=books&qid=1264119088&sr=1-1 (last visited Jan. 21, 2010) (showing that the customer
ratings for the Twilight boxed set were mostly around five stars, indicating the series’ popu-
larity with consumers) (graph on file with the Maryland Law Review).
294. Id.
295. See Customer Reviews: Robsessed, supra note 287 (showing the unusual spread of cus- R
tomer rankings for the Robsessed DVD with most consumers rating the DVD either five stars
or one star but very few rating the DVD in the middle).
296. Id.
297. BroLo, Review of Robsessed: Stolen Material and Rip-off, AMAZON.COM (Oct. 8, 2009),
http://www.amazon.com/Robsessed-Robert-Pattinson/product-reviews/B002OKK2B6/ref
=dp_top_cm_cr_acr_txt?ie=UTF8&showViewpoints=1 (“Do not support a company that
blantantly [sic] steals work from fan sites: WORD FOR WORD.  No permission granted,
just stole blog posts and pictures to promote their video.”); DeadBunnyDip “Bunny in a
Blender,” Review of Robsessed: Nothing You Haven’t Already Seen.  Why Spend $18 When You
Get Rob Info Online for FREE?, AMAZON.COM (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.amazon.com/Rob-
sessed-Robert-Pattinson/product-reviews/B002OKK2B6/ref=dp_top_cm_cr_acr_txt?ie=UT
F8&showViewpoints=1 (“Several reviews have stated that this DVD has NO personal inter-
views with the subject, and has mostly second/third-hand information.”).
298. ROBSESSED (Revolver Entertainment 2009).
299. See Customer Reviews: Robsessed, supra note 287. R
300. See Gozde, supra note 87 (noting that the site was “a victim of plaigirism [sic]”). R
301. Id. (“[Revolver Entertainment] claim[s] it’s an ‘all access DVD.’  I wonder who/
what else they ‘accessed’ without permission.”).
302. Id.
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later removed the offending material from its website without ex-
pressly acknowledging that it had received the letter.303
This episode is illuminating on a number of fronts.  For one, it
belies the norm: A small group of bloggers brought a complaint
against a commercial production company where, more typically, cop-
yright actions involve a commercial enterprise proceeding against in-
dividuals.304  This example illustrates that when Web 2.0 technologies
empower consumers to become creators, those consumer-creators will
seek to protect their own creations just as surely as commercial pro-
ducers of valuable copyrighted works.
Moreover, unlike deep pocketed commercial copyright holders
with their own teams of legal advisors, the bloggers had to proceed
with their own legal understandings.  Their initial description of the
incident did not mention copyright infringement at all, despite the
fact that copyright infringement was at issue.305  The bloggers instead
described Revolver’s conduct in terms of plagiarism.306  This, of
course, is an accurate description of Revolver’s conduct, but generally
not a claim that gives rise to a legal remedy.307  Further, the bloggers
describe plagiarism as a crime, which, at least in legal terms, it is not.308
The bloggers desired to protect their idol, Robert Pattinson, from
unauthorized commercial exploitation, noting that: “Our stand on
the DVD is still the same.  It’s unauthorized, Robert Pattinson is not
getting a dime from it and [Revolver] managed to anger us, the fan
base by stealing.”309  The bloggers drew a distinction between their
own activities and those of the makers of the unauthorized DVD: They
saw nothing wrong with their own online activities, nonprofit public
303. See id. (“The Robsessed-DVD website has now taken down our content . . . .  We
never heard back from Revolver Entertainment but we assume they got our cease and
desist.”).
304. See, e.g., BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming judg-
ment for copyright owners against an individual downloader because “downloading full
copies of copyrighted material without compensation to authors cannot be deemed ‘fair
use’”).
305. See supra note 90 (“Plagiarism is an awful crime and we should always stick together R
to fight it.”).
306. See Gozde, supra note 87. R
307. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 101, § 8D.03[A][2][c], at 8D-42 (noting that R
while plagiarism is an ethical wrong, it “is not in fact a legal doctrine” (quoting Kindergart-
ners Count, Inc. v. DeMoulin, 249 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1251 (D. Kan. 2003))).
308. Gozde, supra note 87; see also Jacqui Lipton, More on Digital Copyright Norms . . . and R
Twilight, MADISONIAN.NET (Dec. 11, 2009), http://madisonian.net/2009/12/11/more-on-
digital-copyright-norms-and-twilight (explaining “that the actual legal complaint is about
copyright infringement,” not plagiarism).
309. See Gozde, supra note 87. R
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discourse about Pattinson including text, photos, and videos, but they
eschewed unauthorized commercial exploitation.310
The parallels and divergences between the bloggers’ conceptions
of their legal rights and actual law capture the extent to which current
online social norms (mis)align with intellectual property law.  These
norms may therefore teach us something about potential future direc-
tions for the law based on the norms, or vice versa.  Perhaps the mis-
understanding in the bloggers’ complaints regarding the differences
between plagiarism and copyright does not matter in practice.  From
the complaining party’s viewpoint, whether a letter of complaint is
framed in either way may be irrelevant if it results in the desired ac-
tion.311  In this instance, Revolver removed the offending material
from its website, presumably in response to the cease and desist no-
tice.312  But, a lawyer may ponder whether the public should be better
educated about copyright law, particularly now that members of the
public are increasingly becoming creators in Web 2.0 forums.313
One particular statement on the robsessedpattinson.com blog is a
good example of where public education could be helpful: “Plagia-
rism is an awful crime and we should always stick together to fight
it.”314  While plagiarism is obviously dishonest, it is not a crime.315
There is also little guidance as to how we can “stick together”316 to
fight it.  If the law was easier to understand and if consumer-creators
had a better sense of where they might obtain legal assistance, the
copyright system might create fairer results.  Blogs themselves could
be rich sources of such public education if people with relevant infor-
mation blogged more about these issues.
I, for example, have posted on an intellectual property law blog
about the Robsessed scenario.317  A blogger from the robsessedpatti-
310. See id. (venting about what had happened with Revolver Entertainment and then
resolving to “go back to our Robert Pattinson coverage :)”).
311. See Lipton, supra note 308 (noting that the fan club could have sued Revolver En- R
tertainment for trademark infringement if they actually had “[a trademark] in the ‘Rob-
sessed’ name,” which would have been more fruitful financially, but explaining that the fan
club wanted “to retain credit for their own work”).
312. See Gozde, supra note 87; see also Lipton, supra note 308 (“The bloggers apparently R
sent a cease and desist notice to Revolver and the offending material was later removed
from Revoler’s [sic] blog.”).
313. Cf. Pavel, supra note 243, at 1640 & n.159 (addressing public education about copy- R
right infringement and noting that “[e]ducation is one of the main strategies that the
content industries use to combat widespread digital piracy by the public at large”).
314. Gozde, supra note 87. R
315. See supra note 307. R
316. Gozde, supra note 87. R
317. See Lipton, supra note 308. R
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son.com fansite saw the entry and entered into an online discussion
about her legal rights.318  In this way, Web 2.0 technologies can enable
norms and laws to interact.319  If lawyers and nonlawyers blog together
about legal issues, nonlawyers obtain a better understanding of their
legal rights, and lawyers learn more about emerging online norms.320
Of course none of this goes directly to the official legislators and
policymakers—Congress and the Judiciary—unless they are also trol-
ling the blogosphere for information, or are encouraging their aides
and judicial clerks to do so.321  Regardless, lawmakers should pay
more attention to the blogosphere to better understand the complex
interplay of interests in copyrights online with a view to better reflect-
ing those interests in digital copyright law.
Interestingly, it seems like the robsessedpattinson.com bloggers
did not realize that they might have a common law trademark corre-
sponding with their domain name that Revolver may have infringed
or diluted.322  If the bloggers had wanted to bring a trademark action
against Revolver, they may have succeeded in obtaining an injunction
against distribution of the DVD323 (but they instead seemed happy
318. See Gozde, Response to More on Digital Copyright Norms . . . and Twilight, MADISONIAN.
NET (Dec. 12, 2009, 10:54 AM), http://madisonian.net/2009/12/11/more-on-digital-copy-
right-norms-and-twilight/ (commenting that Revolver Entertainment “w[as] taking our
blog posts and posting them on their site like they wrote it” and asking whether it was
“[p]laigirism [sic]” or “copyright infringement”).
319. Cf. Lipton, supra note 308 (“So to me this is another interesting example of where R
the realities of [intellectual property] law don’t necessarily meet the social norms in the
entertainment area.”).
320. Naturally, lawyers engaging in this kind of conduct need to be careful that their
discussions do not amount to offering legal advice in states in which they are not licensed
to practice.  For a more thorough discussion on the “ethical gray areas” posed by legal
blogs and potential sanctions that attorneys may face for unauthorized practice by holding
themselves out as lawyers and dispensing legal advice, see Adrienne E. Carter, Note, Blogger
Beware: Ethical Considerations for Legal Blogs, RICH. J.L. & TECH., Nov. 2007, at 8–16.
321. Cf. Lipton, supra note 113 (“Congress and the courts might do well to take a look at R
what’s actually going on in the blogosphere in terms of the balances currently being struck
between copyright holders and fans.”).
322. See Tober v. APROV.com, No. 1:07cv1252, 2008 WL 4364221, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept.
23, 2008) (“The use of a mark in a domain name and on a website may be sufficient to
create common law trademark rights.”); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.,
985 F. Supp. 949, 956–57 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (“Like trade names, domain names can function
as trademarks, and therefore can be used to infringe trademark rights.”); J. THOMAS MC-
CARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:17.50, at 7-29 (4th ed.
2010) (“A domain name can become a trademark if it is used as a trademark” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). But see Lockheed Martin Corp., 985 F. Supp. at 956 (“When a
domain name is used only to indicate an address on the Internet, the domain name is not
functioning as a trademark.”); MCCARTHY, supra, at 7-30 (explaining that “probably only a
small percentage [of domain names] also play the role of a trademark or service mark”).
323. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1491–93 (11th Cir. 1983)
(noting that an injunction is a remedy to a trademark infringement claim).
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with simply having their own text removed from Revolver’s web-
site).324  But, that may be because they did not realize the full extent
of their legal rights.325
324. See Gozde, supra note 87 (“We’d like to thank all our readers, our fellow bloggers, R
website owners . . . , [and] our friends for their support.”).
325. Of course, a trademark action may be difficult to maintain in the case of an unre-
gistered mark where the mark has not been associated with a commercial product or ser-
vice. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006) (providing a cause of action for infringement of an
unregistered mark where the mark has been “use[d] in commerce”).  Thus, if blogs are
seen as predominantly noncommercial speech forums, it might be difficult to establish an
unregistered mark in a relevant domain name.  See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, The Internet
is a Semicommons, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2799, 2814 (2010) (“The blogosphere, built on an
ethos of sharing one’s own thoughts and linking to others’, is numerically dominated by
noncommercial blogs written for personal reasons . . . .”). But see Anthony Ciolli, Are Blogs
Commercial Speech?, 58 S.C. L. Rev. 725, 729 (2007) (“Whether a blog falls into the commer-
cial speech category may depend on various characteristics of the blog, such as whether it
cross-promotes another business.”).  However, one might take the view that the bloggers
are providing an information service to fans of Robert Pattinson. Cf. id. (explaining that a
blog could fall into the “commercial speech category” if it “cross-promotes another busi-
ness,” such as blogs maintained by practicing attorneys).  There is some authority in the
trademark law context—mainly in the case of Internet domain name disputes—that any-
thing that happens on the Internet can be described as sufficiently “in commerce” for the
purposes of trademark infringement and dilution.  Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v.
Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629, 1997 WL 133313, at *3–7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997) (noting that (1)
“defendant’s [cybersquatting] actions affect plaintiff’s ability to offer plaintiff’s services . . .
offered in forty-eight states and over the Internet” and “place defendant within the reach
of the Lanham Act,” and (2) “Internet users constitute a national, even international, audi-
ence, who must use interstate telephone lines to access defendant’s web site on the In-
ternet,” which meet the “‘in commerce’” requirement).  Admittedly, these judicial
comments are largely aimed at determining whether a defendant’s activities are sufficiently
in commerce for trademark purposes, rather than whether the plaintiff’s use of a mark is
operating as a commercial source identifier. Id. at *1, *3–4 (noting that plaintiff “has
moved to preliminarily enjoin” the defendant from using the domain name and focusing
on defendant’s actions).  Nevertheless, the notion that anything happening on the In-
ternet is automatically in commerce might have broader application.  For instance, if rob-
sessedpattinson.com operates as a trademark, it is possible that the use of a substantially
similar phrase, Robsessed, as the title for a commercial DVD, comprises trademark in-
fringement or dilution by blurring.  A trademark infringement action might be successful
in these circumstances because it is hinged on the defendant confusing consumers as to
the source or origin of a particular product or service. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).  As
the Robsessed movie title bears a striking similarity to the robsessedpattinson.com domain
name and the DVD is aimed at a very similar market to the fan website (fans of Robert
Pattinson), Revolver Entertainment might well be liable for trademark infringement.  Con-
sumer confusion is not a necessary element of a trademark dilution action.  AM Gen. Corp.
v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 812 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Dilution differs from trade-
mark infringement; it does not require a showing of consumer confusion as to source.”).
Thus, if the bloggers had a trademark in their domain name, they would not need to
establish confusion to mount a dilution action, although they would have to assert that
their trademark was sufficiently “famous” as required by the dilution statute. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(1) (providing that “the owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or
through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against another person
who, at any time after the owner’s mark has become famous, commences use . . . that is
likely to cause dilution”); id. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (defining “famous” and providing factors for
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IV. COPYRIGHT LESSONS FROM THE VAMPIRE BLOGOSPHERE
Some general trends relating to copyright law and policy in the
Web 2.0 context can be extrapolated from this eclectic mix of case
studies.  The studies nicely illustrate some of the emerging interac-
tions between online norms, copyright laws, and to some extent mar-
ket forces326 and shed light on the attitudes of those who are often
underrepresented in intellectual property policy debates—individual
authors and their consumer-creator fan bases.  At least three signifi-
cant points can be drawn from the case studies that would be useful
areas for future debate and development in copyright law and policy:
(1) the relevance of intention to Web 2.0 copyright law and enforce-
ment policies;327 (2) the varying perspectives on copyright protections
of different stakeholders including original authors and their fans;328
and (3) the problematic application of the fair use doctrine within the
Web 2.0 remix culture.329
A. The Role of Intention in Copyright Infringement
The first three case studies are good illustrations of the signifi-
cance of intention within the Web 2.0 copyright context.330  In each
case, an apparent mismatch emerges between how potential copyright
infringers think the law works—or should work—and how the law ac-
tually works.  In the first case study, Stephenie Meyer emphasized the
intentions of those to whom she had released her draft Midnight Sun
manuscript.331  The fans creating mashup videos in the second case
study and the young woman taking the video in the movie theater in
the third case study also felt that their intentions not to infringe copy-
“determining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition”); id.
§ 1125(c)(2)(B) (defining “‘dilution by blurring’”).
326. See generally, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 266, 271, 282–83 (discussing the R
MPAA’s zero tolerance policy on digital copyright piracy, an example of a market force in
this context).
327. See infra Part IV.A.
328. See infra Part IV.B.
329. See infra Part IV.C.
330. One could equally say that these case studies demonstrate a mismatch between the
expectations of authors and users of copyrighted works.  If the focus is on developing
norms, then author-user communities need the time and opportunity to create clearer
community rules about appropriate uses of protected works.  This has occurred over time
in other contexts. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 35, at 680–84 (noting the emergence of R
norms between jambands and their fans about appropriate uses of otherwise protected
works); see also supra note 50. R
331. See supra text accompanying notes 100–06. R
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right should count for something.332  The strict liability basis of copy-
right law, however, does not take intention into account.333
We might draw two distinct conclusions about the relevance of
intention in the copyright law context.  First, copyright infringers are
simply ignorant of copyright law and need to be better educated to
understand that copyright infringement involves strict liability.334  Sec-
ond, current copyright law and policy is fundamentally wrong, and the
law is not sufficiently tailored to the realities of consumer uses of
works involving modern digital technologies.335  While strict liability
may have made sense when technology was less sophisticated, it now
arguably causes harm to society’s ability to express itself using these
new, more interactive technologies.  Thus, copyright law might be
working counter to its underlying aims of encouraging innovation and
artistic expression.336
There is some merit to the first conclusion—that copyright policy
works just fine and consumer-creators need to be better educated.
The law has developed to protect copyright holders against unautho-
rized uses of their works for good reason.337  Then, consumer-creators
need to be aware not only that copyright infringement involves strict
liability, but they also need to be better educated on how to mount
effective defenses to infringement claims.  And there is the rub: The
most obvious defense for copyright infringement in the consumer-cre-
ator context is fair use.338  But, the contours of the defense are too
vague for consumers to know with any degree of certainty whether
their activities—mashup videos, private recordings, or fan fiction—
comprise fair use in any given case.339  Additionally, there is little ex
ante guidance as to whether a particular use will be regarded as a fair
use.340  Potential infringers would thus need to be prepared to defend
against a copyright infringement action to establish their defense.  A
332. See supra text accompanying notes 158–60, 272. R
333. See supra note 101. R
334. See generally, e.g., supra notes 160, 313 and accompanying text. R
335. See Lipton, supra note 308 (explaining that the Robsessed case study “is another R
interesting example of where the realities of [intellectual property] law don’t necessarily
meet the social norms in the entertainment area”).
336. See LEAFFER, supra note 32, at 24–25 (“[C]opyright law represents an economic R
tradeoff between encouraging the optimal creation of works of authorship through mo-
nopoly incentives, and providing for their optimal access, use, and distribution through
limiting doctrines.”).
337. See id. (explaining that “copyright law provides the incentive to create information
and a shelter to develop and protect it”).
338. See generally supra text accompanying notes 169–70. R
339. See supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text. R
340. See supra note 157. R
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consumer-creator will thus always be on the defensive.  An individual
can take no affirmative action to establish a fair use; a mere assertion
on a YouTube video that the video is a fair use or that no copyright
infringement was intended will not be determinative.341
Another wrinkle to relying on the first conclusion—that copy-
right policy is fine as is—is that when criminal cases are considered
alongside civil actions, the law becomes even more confusing.  It is
currently unclear whether intent is an aspect of criminal copyright
law: According to Nimmer, American courts have generally required
the prosecution to establish proof of intent or willfulness on the part
of the alleged infringer in a criminal copyright case.342  But, it is un-
clear whether this means intent to copy or intent to infringe.343  When
applied to a situation like the third case study—involving potential
criminal action for incidental videotaping of a snippet of a film—it is
not clear how an intent inquiry might play out.  Tumpach, the poten-
tial criminal defendant, probably did not intend to infringe copyright
law (particularly if intent is interpreted as purposely pointing a video
camera in the general direction of a movie screen and pressing the
record button), but she may have intended to copy snippets of the
movie.344
Intention is perhaps more relevant in the criminal context
(clearly downplayed or overlooked by the police in the Tumpach situ-
ation) as the defendant must act with a motive for commercial
profit.345  In this respect, the Tumpach case study evidences the need
for better education of those enforcing criminal copyright law rather
than better education of copyright consumers.  If a motive of commer-
cial profit is a requirement of a criminal copyright prosecution, then
Tumpach should not have been detained, given that three minutes of
film footage with her own voice obscuring the audio track could never
be the basis of a commercially profitable enterprise.346
341. See supra notes 153–57 and accompanying text. R
342. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 101, § 15.01[A][2], at 15-4 to -6 (noting R
that criminal infringement requires commercial advantage and willfulness, which has
meant “intent to copy, not to infringe” or a “‘voluntary, intentional violation of a known
legal duty’” (quoting United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (D. Neb. 1991))).
343. Id. (“Some courts have suggested that ‘willful’ for these purposes may mean only an
intent to copy, not to infringe.”).
344. See supra text accompanying note 270. R
345. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 101, § 15.01[A][2], at 15-5 (“It is not neces- R
sary that the accused actually realize such a commercial advantage or private financial gain,
so long as the infringing activity is geared towards that goal.”).
346. See Abramovitz, supra note 272 (explaining that Tumpach never meant to “inten- R
tionally record or sell the movie, and had merely been shooting footage from her sister’s
29th birthday party,” proven by the fact that she was “talking throughout the taped footage
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In sum, strict liability in copyright law potentially generates a
large amount of uncertainty: It forces consumers to rely on the fair
use defense with all of its inherent uncertainties of application.347
And it also leaves those enforcing copyrights in the criminal sphere
struggling with the extent to which criminal liability should differ
from civil liability in terms of intent, if at all.  If intent were to become
an aspect of civil copyright law, then some of these problems might be
alleviated and the realities of Web 2.0 society—as evidenced by online
discussions, including comments by original authors and their fans—
might better be realized.
This does not advocate that a true copyright infringement should
be excused when someone posts a “no intent to infringe” notice.348
Maybe intent could capture some of the more salient aspects of copy-
right infringement ex ante—especially the question of whether the
potential infringer had a commercial profit motive that might com-
pete with the copyright holder’s commercial exploitation of the work.
Considering this issue in the context of the initial infringement ques-
tion might be a better approach than relegating the commercial com-
petition point to the fair use defense.349  In the latter context, the
intent question might get lost in the balancing of the other fair use
factors, as well as forcing the consumer-creator to perpetually be on
the defensive with no ex ante opportunity to raise a claim that her
activities are not infringing.
Allowing the intent factor to stand on its own in the initial in-
fringement inquiry might better focus market participants, and ulti-
mately courts, on the realities of Web 2.0 interactions.  In other words,
it may be better to bring copyright law more in line with existing aims
and expectations of copyright stakeholders than to educate those par-
ties about laws and policies that are out of touch with the realities of
modern online interactions.
in question”); Bell, supra note 269 (explaining that the movie was three minutes and that R
she was talking the whole time).
347. See supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text. R
348. See, e.g., 1ExtremeEnigma1, Hollywood Undead – No.5 (W / Lyrics), YOUTUBE, http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=_fW8I5O-WUU (last visited Sept. 14, 2010) (“Hollywood Un-
dead, please just listen for one second.  It is not my intent to infringe your rights to this
song, you own it, not me.”).
349. That is, in the context of the fourth statutory fair use factor: “the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”  17 U.S.C. § 107(4)
(2006).
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B. What Creators Want: Autonomy Versus Profit
The first and fourth case studies illustrate what we might learn
from the blogosphere about the desires and motivations of authors
with respect to their own original creations—as distinct from the
needs of their commercial producers and distributors.  Unlike the fo-
cus of traditional copyright discourse on commercially motivated pro-
ducers and distributors, the individual authors in these two case
studies were more concerned with interests traditionally associated
with moral rights.350  In neither case were the authors openly con-
cerned about the impact of the wrongdoer’s conduct on their own
ability to commercially profit from their work.  Rather, in the first case
study, Meyer was concerned about her ability to control the form in
which readers ultimately experienced her work.351  The bloggers from
the fourth case study were concerned that their work was taken with-
out their consent or any attribution;352 they might have consented if
they had been asked or if their work had been attributed to them.
Even though Meyer expressed herself on her blog as being con-
cerned about copyright infringement, her key complaint seemed to
relate to what a European lawyer might describe as a moral right—
notably the right of integrity353 to control the form in which a work is
exposed to the public.354  In jurisdictions with moral rights law, the
right of integrity subsists in the author independently of copyright.355
The copyright may be assigned to another person, but the right of
integrity remains in the hands of the author and is sometimes exer-
cised in tension with the rights of the copyright holder.356  Thus, for
example, a copyright holder may want to display a work of art in a
particular way, say, by printing copies on a tee shirt.  While copyright
ownership may allow this, an author could object to the use under the
right of integrity.  The United States has enacted only very limited
350. See supra notes 131–37, 324 and accompanying text. R
351. See supra text accompanying notes 104–08, 114–18. R
352. See supra Gozde, note 318; see also supra text accompanying notes 309–10. R
353. Meyer, supra note 2 (noting that “[a]s the author of the Twilight Saga, [she] con- R
trols the copyright and it is up to [her as] the owner of the copyright to decide when the
books should be made public”).  See generally Ong, supra note 132. R
354. See Ong, supra note 132, at 298 (“Moral rights confer on the artist a set of entitle- R
ments that relate to how his works are treated, presented, displayed, and otherwise utilized
after he has relinquished title over the physical objects in which those works are embod-
ied.” (footnote omitted)).
355. See Eric M. Brooks, Comment, “Tilted” Justice: Site-Specific Art and Moral Rights After
U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1431, 1434–35 (1989) (commenting
that moral rights, such as the right of integrity, are separate from copyright law and ex-
plaining the French law approach).
356. Ong, supra note 132, at 305. R
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\70-1\MLR101.txt unknown Seq: 53 14-DEC-10 13:41
2010] COPYRIGHT’S TWILIGHT ZONE 53
moral rights legislation, particularly under the Visual Artists Rights
Act.357  These rights do not extend to authors such as Meyer.358
The United States has argued that copyright law, augmented by
trademark and unfair competition law, does much of the work that
moral rights law does in other jurisdictions.359  Alongside exercising
some control through copyright law—where the author holds a copy-
right in a work she has created—the author may also be a trademark
holder with respect to her work because her name is a source indica-
tor for the work.360  Thus, if someone else makes a use of the work in
commerce in a misleading, deceptive, or confusing way or, perhaps
more to the point, in a way that dilutes the author’s name as a mark,
that person could be subject to trademark liability.361  So, for instance,
an author might argue that the presentation by someone else of her
work—particularly in a form in which she would not have released the
work—dilutes her name as a mark in the commercial book market.
On her website, Meyer does not assert trademark interests in this
way but speaks only of copyright infringement.362  There are likely a
variety of reasons for this.363  For one, Meyer did not want to bring an
action against those who released her draft manuscript for Midnight
Sun over the Internet.364  Thus, it does not matter what right she
might have asserted because she did not intend to bring an action.  As
an expressive matter, copyright law probably makes more sense in this
357. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601–610, 104 Stat.
5089, 5128–33 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); 3 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 101, § 8D.06, at 8D-68 (noting that Congress adopted federal legis- R
lation “implementing moral rights in a limited sphere, viz. in the realm of certain visual
arts,” but beyond that arena, “embrace[d] general moral rights” (footnote omitted)).
358. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 101, 8D.06[A][1], at 8D-69 (noting that R
“[t]he Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 begins by defining a new category: ‘work of visual
art,’” which includes “a ‘painting, drawing, print, or sculpture’” and “[a]ny such item that
exists solely in a unique original” (footnotes omitted) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006))).
359. See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 254
(2006) (noting that “[f]or the most part, the U.S. has resisted any formal recognition of
moral rights for authors” and “has taken the position that other federal and state laws
outside of copyright approximate the moral rights of integrity and attribution required by
the Berne Convention”).
360. See, e.g., Clinton v. Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum No. FA0502000414641, 2005
WL 853535 (Mar. 18, 2005) (Atkinson, Arb.) (holding that Hillary Clinton held an unregis-
tered trademark right in her personal name based on the “use and exposure of the mark
in the marketplace and through use of the mark in connection with [her] political activi-
ties, including a successful Senate campaign”).
361. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (c) (2006).
362. See Meyer, supra note 2 (noting that she “control[s] the copyright”). R
363. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 113 (opining that “‘Twilight’ remixes create more buzz R
for the movies, which ultimately benefits the producers”).
364. See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. R
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context than trademark law.365  Copyright law aims to protect authors’
rights while trademark law seeks to prevent unfair practices in com-
mercial markets.366  As a corollary, for an author to bring a successful
trademark infringement or dilution action, the defendant must have
used the author’s mark “in commerce.”367  It is not clear that anony-
mous online bloggers have acted in commerce as required by trade-
mark law by posting a draft online.  While some courts have taken the
view that anything posted online could be in commerce for trademark
purposes,368 other courts have not accepted this view.369
While Meyer might not have sought to enforce a moral rights
claim judicially, a moral rights claim may better have expressed her
concerns about the unauthorized dissemination of her draft manu-
script in violation of her authorial integrity than the available copy-
right and trademark laws.  In this sense, a law more in line with an
author’s expectations of her artistic rights might bolster the develop-
ment of appropriate online norms.
Although a detailed consideration of moral rights law in the
American context is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting
that commentators have examined the possibility of reinvigorating the
moral rights debate in countries such as the United States and Ca-
nada.370  Some of these commentators have noted that moral rights
365. See supra note 55. R
366. Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81 TEMP. L.
REV. 433, 447 (2008) (noting that copyright laws grant authors certain rights, while
“[t]rademark laws prevent others from putting into commercial channels goods or services
that are . . . identical to or confusingly similar to those sponsored by the rights holders”).
367. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1), (c)(1) (2006); see Alicia Gamez, WhenU.com, Inc. & Google
Inc.: Parsing Trademark’s Use Requirement, 21 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 403, 404 (2006) (explaining
that trademark protection was enacted under Congress’s Commerce Clause power and
noting that “Section 1127 [of the United States Code] defines the terms ‘trademark’ and
‘use in commerce’ (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127)); see also supra note 325. R
368. See Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629, 1997 WL 133313,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. March 24, 1997) (stating that defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark was in
commerce under the “sweeping reach” of the Lanham Act because defendant’s actions
interfered with plaintiff’s ability to offer services “in forty-eight states and over the In-
ternet” and Internet users “must use interstate telephone lines to access defendant’s web
site” (citing Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283 (1952))).
369. See Bosley Med. Inst. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 679–80 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that
“[t]he Lanham Act, expressly enacted to be applied in commercial contexts, does not pro-
hibit all unauthorized uses of a trademark”); Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Discovery Com-
puting, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 889, 897 (D. Utah 2007) (noting that “[r]elatively few courts
have adopted [the] view” “that ‘the national, and even international, nature of the Internet
itself makes defendants’ use of plaintiffs’ trademark as a domain name a “use in com-
merce” for purposes of the Lanham Act.’” (quoting OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc.,
86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 186 (W.D.N.Y. 2000))).
370. See generally, e.g., ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A
MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 147–65 (2010); NETANEL, supra note 55, at R
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law “preserv[es] the [important] relationship between [the] author
and the text.”371  Moral rights also support the use of authorial iden-
tity as a proxy for quality judgments about a work.372  In this vein,
Professor Neil Netanel has suggested that “those who disseminate a
creative appropriation should be required to label it as an unlicensed
modification of the original work.”373  Professor Roberta Rosenthal
Kwall has similarly suggested that those who modify a work against the
wishes of the author should “be required to provide a disclaimer ade-
quate to inform the public of the author’s objection to the modifica-
tion or contextual usage.”374  Commentators have further suggested
that it serves the overall public interest for jurisdictions to adopt some
level of moral rights protections because consumers of works them-
selves have interests in preserving the integrity of the original work.375
The Midnight Sun and robsessedpattinson.com case studies also
raise issues about the role of individual authors in the Web 2.0 copy-
right matrix, particularly now that consumer-creators, like fan
bloggers, are beginning to assert legal rights in their work.  For one
thing, more must be done to educate consumer-creators on their
rights in relation to works they create online.376  Perhaps mechanisms
should also be developed to ease access to enforcement of those
215–17 (arguing for a modified moral rights law for the United States); Wilkinson & Gero-
lami, supra note 23, at 326–27 (examining the development of moral rights additions to R
Canadian law, noting, in particular, that “[t]he [current] terminology and arrangement” is
“somewhat confusing” and arguing that “inherent reasons [exist] why moral rights protec-
tion should be increasingly embraced by nations in the emerging information age”).
371. Wilkinson & Gerolami, supra note 23, at 321–22 (noting that “the economic rights R
in copyright” and “moral rights” “function in complimentary, though distinct, manners” as
there is an “expanding role moral rights can play in the new information environment
[that] has largely gone unrecognized and has not been clearly articulated”).
372. See id. at 325 (“[E]conomic rights cannot, in and of themselves, function to support
either use of the author’s identity as a mechanism for quality judgments about the work or
reliance upon the author to control the integrity of the work as initially conceived.  Those
who seek indications of the authority for information presented in a work must look else-
where.”); see also id. at 327–28 (noting that “[m]oral rights provisions, according to [one]
theory, assume a bond between the author and the work,” that “to preserve integrity for
the author, one must preserve the integrity of the work or use the work as the author
intended,” and that “[m]oral rights affect the information seeker’s ability to judge the
quality of the available information sources and to thus select from amongst competing
sources”).
373. NETANEL, supra note 55, at 215. R
374. KWALL, supra note 370, at 151. R
375. See Wilkinson & Gerolami, supra note 23, at 327–30 (opining that “inherent reasons R
[exist] why moral rights protection should be increasingly embraced by nations in the
emerging information age,” specifically the United States and Canada, and that “users
[are] interested in preserving the integrity of the work” (citing Justin Hughes, “Recoding”
Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923 (1999))).
376. See, e.g., supra note 313. R
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rights.  For example, if the cease and desist notice had not worked for
the bloggers, they may not have been able to afford the costs of litiga-
tion against Revolver, rendering knowledge of their legal rights
useless.377
These case studies further demonstrate that copyrights are often
only a proxy for what many authors really want in terms of control of
their literary and artistic works.  Despite the “neglect” of many eco-
nomically developed countries for moral rights, it might be worth re-
considering that position in the Web 2.0 context.378  Because Web 2.0
technologies allow more to be done with the works of others without
their authorization,379 rights to attribution and integrity arguably take
on greater significance.380  The creation of more authorship rights
causes remixers to run into trouble against the rights of attribution
and integrity.  Attribution may not practically be too problematic if a
good faith remixer acknowledges her sources publicly, but integrity
could present a quandary if an original artist objects to the content of
the remix.  Thus, even if a remixer obtains copyright permission or
successfully asserts a fair use defense, she could still face difficulties if
the author independently asserts an action based on the moral right
of integrity.  Some authors have argued that if moral rights law is to be
adopted in the United States, the focus should be on the right of attri-
bution rather than on the right of integrity.381  Professor Netanel has
pointed out that statistically American authors seem to be more inter-
377. Cf. Brent C. Johnson, Note, The Making Available Argument: Is Actual Distribution
Required to Find Infringement Upon the Copyright Holder’s Distribution Right?, 85 N.D. L. REV.
371, 375–77 (2009) (explaining how “individuals who can ill-afford the costs of litigation”
are forced to settle or represent themselves in lawsuits brought by the Recording Industry
Association of America, “a large, wealthy, corporate entity” alleging “that users infringed
on sound recording copyrights”).
378. See Wilkinson & Gerolami, supra note 23, at 329–30 (claiming that there is an inter- R
national trend toward “neglect[ing]” moral rights, explaining that “[e]ven  in countries
where moral rights provisions exist, such as Canada, moral rights may have suffered ero-
sion,” and suggesting that the United States “continues to resist the introduction of moral
rights into its copyright legislation”); cf. sources cited supra note 370 (citing examples of R
commentators arguing for increased moral rights in North American jurisdictions).
379. See generally Johnson, supra note 377, at 371 (stating that technologies like “com- R
puters, electronic networks, and the Internet” “raise difficult and controversial issues con-
cerning intellectual property,” like copyright infringement).
380. See Wilkinson & Gerolami, supra note 23, at 329 (arguing that the increase in “revo- R
lutionary technology” should correlate with an increase in the role of moral rights).
381. See, e.g., KWALL, supra note 370, at 151 (suggesting that there should be a “broadly R
defined right of attribution” and a “narrowly tailored right of integrity”).
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ested in attribution than integrity382 and that a right of attribution
would be relatively easy to enforce in the digital realm.383
The emergence of Web 2.0 technologies is a reason to revisit the
moral rights question in the United States and requires balancing the
moral rights of authors against the moral rights of others participating
in the Web 2.0 culture.384  This balance may not be easy to strike in
practice.  The costs of adopting moral rights may ultimately outweigh
the benefits in terms of facilitating creativity online.385 Alternatively, if
a “watered down” version of moral rights is adopted, perhaps it should
focus on the right of attribution rather than the right of integrity.386
However, the moral rights debate has not yet played out in the Web
2.0 context in the United States.387  Even if moral rights are ultimately
rejected or watered down in this context, having the discussion may
lead to a greater awareness of how copyright law might apply in Web
2.0 forums to protect the rights of individual authors without unneces-
sarily impinging on commercially neutral remixing activities.
C. Fair Use in the Blogosphere
The second case study involving fan remixes—and to some ex-
tent, the fourth focusing on the Robert Pattison fan blog—raise ques-
tions about whether the fair use defense to copyright infringement is
382. NETANEL, supra note 55, at 217 (“Creative Commons has estimated that, as of Feb- R
ruary 2005, authors chose licenses requiring attribution some 94 percent of the time and,
in contrast, chose licenses prohibiting the making of a derivative work less than one-third
of the time.”); see also ASS’N OF INDEP. VIDEO & FILMMAKERS ET AL., DOCUMENTARY FILM-
MAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE 4–6 (2005) (emphasizing the impor-
tance of authorship attribution in documentary fair use best practices guidelines); Rebecca
Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 2007, at 135, 153–57 (examining how authorship attribution is an important norm
among fan fiction communities).
383. See NETANEL, supra note 55, at 216 (“Digital technology may well ease the burden of R
compliance [with an attribution requirement].  In fact, it might entail nothing more than
leaving intact the copyright management information that is digitally embedded in the
underlying work when portions of that work are incorporated in the creative
appropriation.”).
384. See generally Geri J. Yonover, The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use,
14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79, 80 (1996) (arguing that “society needs the ‘parent’ and
the ‘child’: the first artist and the parodist” and that the “goal should be to balance their
economic and personal interests”).
385. See generally id. at 122 (acknowledging that giving moral rights to authors impedes
on the parodist’s ability to create).
386. See, e.g., supra note 381. R
387. See, e.g., Jacqueline D. Lipton, Moral Rights and Supernatural Fiction:  Authorial Dignity
and the New Moral Rights Agendas, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. (forthcoming
2011) (suggesting the need to revisit the question of a moral rights agenda in the United
States in light of the emergence of Web 2.0 technologies).
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working—or can work—effectively in the Web 2.0 context.  Aspects of
the fair use defense that have always existed come into sharp relief in
the Web 2.0 context because of the sheer number of downstream con-
sumer-creators online388 that make derivative works.389  The equitable
rule of reason approach to American fair use390 differs from most
other countries that have established more clearly delineated rules for
fair dealing.391  The American approach has both advantages and dis-
advantages.  The advantages inhere in its flexibility of application to
new situations.392  The disadvantages include its inherently uncertain
application and unclear determination of a particular issue absent liti-
gation393 (there is no ex ante guidance as to whether a particular use
of a copyrighted work will be a fair use or not).394
This can be particularly challenging in the Web 2.0 context be-
cause of the sheer number of online participants who might assert fair
use, the geographical mix of regions in which those people might re-
side, and the variety of activities engaged in by the remix culture.395
Previously, most fan uses of copyrighted works involved copying for
purely consumptive personal use.396  Today, consumers become cre-
ators as a result of the cheap and easy accessibility of recording and
388. See Mary W.S. Wong, “Transformative” User-Generated Content in Copyright Law: Infring-
ing Derivative Works or Fair Use?, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1075, 1077 (2009) (“Digital
tools are increasingly ubiquitous in our information-driven society, allowing just about any-
one with a computer to reuse, recreate, and otherwise change all manner of literary and
artistic works . . . .”).
389. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “derivative work” as “a work based upon one or
more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fiction-
alization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, conden-
sation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted” and
further including “[a] work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or
other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship”).
390. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text. R
391. See, e.g., Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c.3, §§ 28–44 (U.K.) (outlining,
for instance, general provisions, along with specific provisions for education and libraries
and archives).
392. See FRED VON LOHMANN, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., FAIR USE AND DIGITAL RIGHTS
MANAGEMENT: PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE (IRRECONCILABLE?) TENSION BETWEEN THEM
5–6 (2002) (noting the flexibility of the fair use doctrine in adapting to new technologies).
393. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 167, at 283 (“The scheme of providing a broad right to R
control derivative use, subject to fair use exception, puts users at a disadvantage.  Under
fair use, users’ rights are less stable.  Rights would depend on judicial determination.”).
394. See Pavel, supra note 243, at 1617 (“[J]udicial application of the fair use factors to R
personal use technologies is difficult for innovators and users to predict ex ante.”).
395. See supra note 110 (noting the jurisdictional reach problems in copyright cases); R
supra note 388 (emphasizing the amount of consumer-creators and their activities). R
396. Cf. Elkin-Koren, supra note 167, at 243–47 (explaining that digital technology R
“transforms readers from relatively passive receivers of a message, into potential partici-
pants” and “empower[s] individuals to take an active role when experiencing works of
others”).
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remixing technologies.397  Thus, consumer-creators’ relationships to
copyrighted works tend to be more interactive, and the resulting cre-
ations tend to be more transformative.398  In the past, American
courts have stressed the need for a transformative use of a copyrighted
work under the first fair use factor.399
While fans’ creations appear to be more transformative and more
voluminous than ever and are disseminated instantaneously across na-
tional boundaries,400 the vagueness of the American fair use defense
becomes infinitely more problematic.  Particularly troublesome is the
inability to know in advance whether a copyright holder will object to
a given remix or whether a viable fair use defense is available.  Ulti-
mately, it might only take one or two copyright holders threatening
litigation to chill a large amount of online creation by fans.
There are a number of possible approaches to this difficulty.
Legislators and policymakers should think about amending Section
107, or at least providing guidelines to clarify its scope with respect to
typical Web 2.0 remixing activities.  Specifically, guidance about the
application of the fair use defense to typical noncommercial remixing
activities would be useful.  It may be that many noncommercial activi-
ties would, in fact, be found to be fair uses if the cases were ever liti-
gated because of the significance that courts tend to attach in
applying the fair use defense to the first and fourth factors.401  The
first and fourth fair use factors tend to go to the heart of most copy-
right holders’ complaints because copyrights have become predomi-
nantly economic rights in modern markets and most complaints by
commercial copyright holders are aimed at protecting their profits.402
If most noncommercial remixes and blog posts are likely to fall
under the rubric of fair use, it may be a good idea for Congress or the
397. Cf. id. at 241–45 (noting that the “manipulation of digitized works is relatively easy
and inexpensive” and that “interactive systems such as Hypertext empowers readers with
creative powers and expands the number of people who may participate in the creation
process”).
398. See id. (“Interactivity allows a convergence of the message with the adjustments
made by the receiver/user.  Thus, the ability to change the original message is empowering
for individuals.”).
399. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 101, § 13.05[A][1][b], at 13-162 to -172.1 R
for a very thorough discussion of American case law on the issue; see also supra note 179. R
400. See generally Wong, supra note 388, at 1077 (expanding on the numerous ways Web R
2.0 technologies have “allow[ed] anyone with an Internet connection to disseminate the
resulting content, which itself can engender further creation, use, and manipulation”).
401. See supra Part III.C.2.
402. Cf. Wilkinson & Gerolami, supra note 23, at 330 (“The lack of enthusiasm which the R
United States has shown for the moral rights regime may be partially explained by the
emphasis that the United States places upon the commercial exploitation of
information.”).
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Copyright Office to adopt a clear guideline to this effect.  Rather than
waiting for a judicial determination, Web 2.0 participants would have
clearer ex ante guidance as to the scope of legitimate activities involv-
ing copyrighted works.403
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has utilized a series of case studies revolving around
the Twilight franchise to illustrate some of the challenges inherent in
applying intellectual property law to Web 2.0 forums.404  The Twilight
books and movies have no special significance with respect to intellec-
tual property, but the combination of their global popularity and the
open relationship between Meyer and her fans creates a useful back-
drop for discussions of Web 2.0 intellectual property issues that is
helpful in illuminating the copyright law twilight zone.
While no one stakeholder’s views should necessarily outweigh the
views of others in debates about online intellectual property protec-
tion, the discourse thus far has focused largely on the economic needs
of commercial producers and distributors of copyrighted works.  Web
2.0 technologies not only raise challenges to the existing balance of
interests but also create a forum to extract information about the in-
terests of previously sidelined groups.  The case studies illustrate ways
in which this anecdotal data can be used to identify directions for fu-
ture debates about digital copyright policy.  The case studies highlight
issues such as the difficulties of identifying the role of intention within
civil and criminal copyright law and of ascertaining the boundaries of
the fair use defense online.  They present useful, detailed information
about the rights that individual authors want to assert with respect to
their works—as distinct from rights that commercial producers and
distributors seek to enforce.  They further exemplify how Web 2.0
technologies facilitate interactions between the different stakeholder
groups with respect to online copyrights.
This Article has attempted to make some progress toward resolv-
ing challenges currently facing copyright policy in the age of Web 2.0
technologies.  Importantly, it has suggested that information gleaned
from online forums might create a useful starting point for debates
403. Some commentators have suggested other avenues to create ex ante guidance
about the scope of fair use rights in general that could be usefully applied in the Web 2.0
context.  See generally Lipton, supra note 124, at 145–46 (suggesting “the development of an R
administrative agency to hear complaints brought directly by those seeking to make legiti-
mate use of a copyrighted work”); Reichman et al., supra note 242, at 985–96 (suggesting a R
“reverse notice and takedown” procedure).
404. See supra Part III.B–E.
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about the future direction of copyright law.  The blogosphere is a sali-
ent, and often overlooked, source of information about balancing
competing interests in copyrighted works.  Legislators and policymak-
ers might use this information to great advantage at very little cost
when further updating copyright law and policy.  This knowledge
might be useful in renewed debates about whether the development
of a moral rights regime is now necessary in the United States.  It may
also be instrumental if Congress revisits challenges about the role of
intent in copyright law.  Important questions for future debate in-
clude whether copyright infringement should no longer attract strict
liability and whether the vague and flexible fair use test might be re-
placed with a simple doctrine that focuses more clearly on an alleged
infringer’s unjust commercial profit.  The issues addressed in this Arti-
cle may also be useful for the development, recognition, and enforce-
ment of norms in the blogosphere relating to fans’ uses of creative
works.
